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Abstract
This Article begins with an analysis of certain features of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and demonstrates that this clause establishes a fundamental right to the equal benefit of laws
protecting personal security. Laws protecting personal security must be applied evenhandedly. Any
discriminatory application of such laws is presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. This
Article next shows that gay men and lesbians are among the most common victims of hate crime, that hate
crimes against gays and lesbians are significant, persistent and widespread, and that gays and lesbians have a
substantial stake in the manner in which the hate crime phenomenon is addressed. However, the interest of
homosexuals in hate crime legislation is far more compelling than that. Because of societal antipathy toward
gay men and lesbians, legislatures frequently exclude lesbians and gay men from the protection of hate crime
statutes. In such cases, homosexuals are denied the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security, a right
required by the Equal Protection Clause. This Article thus concludes that homosexual men and women have
much more than a mere interest in the protection of hate crime statutes. Once a state decides to enact a hate
crime statute protecting members of certain other societal groups, homosexuals have a constitutional right to
its protection as well.
Keywords
Homosexuality, equality, constitutional rights, liberties
Disciplines
Human Rights Law | Sexuality and the Law
This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/178
HATE CRIMES, HOMOSEXUALS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Anthony S. Winer*
Issues regarding homosexuality and the rights of lesbians and gay
men have been at the forefront of public discourse in recent months.
These issues have arisen in a broad variety of contexts. Some of the more
visible controversies have involved the service of lesbians and gay men
in the armed forces,' local and statewide efforts to limit civil rights for
lesbians and gay men,2 and questions concerning rights to marriage, adop-
tion, and child custody.
3
Another topic of ongoing national debate in recent years has been the
question of so-called "hate crimes." Hate crimes can be characterized as
violent crimes against members of minority groups because of the attack-
ers' prejudice against those groups. Attacks of this kind gained national
notoriety in the late 1980s and early 1990s with such incidents as the
racially motivated killings in the Bensonhurst,4 Howard Beach,5 and Crown
Heights 6 sections of New York City. Violence based on social prejudice
has engendered public outrage, and state and local governments have
enacted numerous laws and ordinances to deal with these hate-motivated
crimes.
*Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. Many
people provided invaluable assistance in the various phases of the preparation of this
Article. At New York University School of Law, I received guidance and encouragement
at the early stages of this work from Professor William Nelson and Thomas Stoddard,
former executive director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Adjunct
Associate Professor of Law. At William Mitchell, I received helpful comments and advice
on early drafts from Professors Kenneth Kirwin, Daniel Kleinberger, Russell Pannier, and
Michael Steenson. My research assistants were William Wassweiler, Steven Sidwell, Lisa
Janzen, Wesley Scott, and Joanne Piper-Maurer. The contributions of all were deeply
appreciated; any errors and misjudgments contained herein are entirely my own.
I See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Ruling on Pentagon's Gay Ban Is Set Aside, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 10, 1994, at B6; Eric Schmitt, Clinton at Impasse with Joint Chiefs in Gay Troop
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1993, at Al.
2 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Voters in Oregon Back Local Anti-Gay Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1993, at A6; Oregon Lawmakers Ban Local Votes on Gay Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 1993, at A8.
3 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii's marriage
laws denied same-sex couples access to marital status); Flowers v. Flowers, 1993 WL
542086 (Tenn., December 30, 1993) (upholding on procedural grounds award of temporary
custody to grandparents of children of a lesbian mother); Mother Files Suit to Block
Adoption of Her Child by a Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A8.
4 See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Youth Hunted in Brooklyn Killing Surrenders, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1, 1989, at A3.
5 See, e.g., Howard Beach Retrial Starts, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1990, at A9.
6 See, e.g., Alan Finder, A Crown Heights Remark Returns to Trouble Cuomo, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, at Cl.
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Such laws have generated nearly as much controversy as the violence
that inspired them, particularly in discussions over their constitutionality.7
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in two recent cases8 decided
within a year of each other, determined that one such law was unconsti-
tutional9 and the other valid. 10
In spite of the recent discussions of legal issues affecting homosexu-
als, and in spite of the current debate concerning the constitutionality of
hate crime statutes, there has as yet been little discussion of the interre-
lationship between lesbians and gay men, the phenomenon of hate crime,
and the constitutionality of hate crime statutes.'1 An important point can
be made about the extent to which lesbians and gay men may claim the
protection of hate crime statutes under the Constitution.
This Article begins with an analysis of certain features of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and demonstrates that
this clause establishes a fundamental right to the equal benefit of laws
protecting personal security. Laws protecting personal security must be
applied even-handedly. Any discriminatory application of such laws is
presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
This Article next shows that gay men and lesbians are among the
most common victims of hate crime, that hate crimes against gays and
lesbians are significant, persistent and widespread, and that gays and
lesbians have a substantial stake in the manner in which the hate crime
phenomenon is addressed.
However, the interest of homosexuals in hate crime legislation is far
more compelling than that. Because of societal antipathy toward gay men
and lesbians, legislatures frequently exclude lesbians and gay men from
the protection of hate crime statutes. In such cases, homosexuals are
denied the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security, a right
required by the Equal Protection Clause.
7 Among the numerous articles and essays on the subject and on the degree of
controversy involved, some of the most helpful are included in Symposium, Penalty
Enhancement for Hate Crimes, 2 CRIM. JuST. ETHics 3 (1992) [hereinafter Symposium,
Penalty Enhancement].
'R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct.
2194 (1993).
9 In R.A. V, the Court determined that the St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance at issue was
facially invalid under the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. 112 S. Ct. at 2547.01n Mitchell, the Court upheld a Wisconsin statute against a challenge primarily
grounded on First Amendment free speech concerns. 113 S. Ct. at 2202. Of course, there
is ample ground for distinction between R.A. V and Mitchell, as discussed at greater length,
infra.
"The most cogent discussion to date was presented as a symposium in Law &
Sexuality, but this material concerned chiefly hate speech, rather than hate crimes involving
physical violence and statutes designed to deal with them. See Symposium, Legal Restric-
tions on Homophobic and Racist Speech: Collateral Consequences on the Lesbian and
Gay Community, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (1992) [HEREINAFTER Homophobic and Racist
Speech].
[Vol. 29
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This Article thus concludes that homosexual men and women have
much more than a mere interest in the protection of hate crime statutes.
Once a state decides to enact a hate crime statute protecting members of
certain other societal groups, homosexuals have a constitutional right to
its protection as well.
I. Background
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has developed along two distinct
avenues: suspect classification analysis 12 and fundamental rights analysis.
This Article employs the latter, which focuses on protecting "fundamental
rights" through the application of the judicially created strict scrutiny test.
Thus, if a state action infringes upon a fundamental right, it will be struck
down unless it is supported by a "compelling state interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest in the least restrictive manner possible."'13
Much controversy exists concerning which rights should be consid-
ered "fundamental" for purposes of equal protection analysis.14 The con-
troversy exists because the Supreme Court has never formulated a defini-
tive test to determine which rights are fundamental. The conception of
such a test has derived in significant part from the work of legal scholars.
Some scholars take a fairly broad view of which rights should be consid-
ered fundamental, 15 and others, more critical of fundamental rights analy-
t2It is fairly well settled that under the "suspect classification" branch of Equal
Protection analysis there are three standards of review that may be applied: strict scrutiny
(applicable to discrimination on the basis of "suspect" classifications), intermediate
scrutiny (applicable to discrimination on the basis of "quasi-suspect" classifications), and
rational basis review (applicable to all other cases). See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebure
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
The courts have generally not considered sexual orientation to be a suspect or even a
quasi-suspect classification. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993); High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990);
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Ben-Sha-
lom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990). Consequently, under these cases state
action that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation would be reviewed under the
rational basis test.
13Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 575 (4th ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1454, § 16-7, at 1458 (2d ed. 1988).
14It is of course also possible to criticize the very concept of framing equal protection
claims in terms of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protec-
tion: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. RPv. 1023, 1074-77 (1979).
Resolution of this broader issue is beyond the scope of this Article, and I will assume that
the fundamental rights branch of equal protection analysis is conceptually sound.15 Jacobus tenBroek stated his view that the Equal Protection Clause "was a confirma-
tory reference to the affirmative duty of government to protect men in their natural rights"
to the full extent of such "natural rights". JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 221-22 (1951). Kenneth Karst suggested that the Equal
Protection Clause be viewed as a vehicle for assuring "equal citizenship," a constitutional
value encompassing "respect, participation and responsibility" to and for all citizens.
HeinOnline -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 389 1994
 ,    
l  s l   
  st ti   . 
     i    
  , l  l t  
it  r t ti   ll. 
 
ti     
: t i i ation is12    . 
 tal 
  l      
    t l  
 lling    
t il  t  i  t at interest in the least restrictive anner possible."13 
rs  i    
 t l"  l l sis.14  
t  i t   t   t   l t   i i
       
   . 
   
 I5 , l  t l  
12 It is fairly well settled that under ilie "suspect classification" branch of Equal 
r t ti  l i  ili r  r  t r  t r s  r i  ili t   li : t i t ti  
i le  i   t" ti s), iate 
i   ti  ili   ct" i ti s),  
l      . ne 
 ). 
 t  ll  r  l     
t ti . , .  
.   , ili   
  ,  ili . , t. i  
l  . t ,  . .  ( ); r  . it  t t ,  .  ,  
, rt. ,   ).    
    l i   ili  
r ti l i  t t. 
13Plyler v. oe, 457 . . 202,  ( ).  l   .     
A,    ili   
 I I L  ,  ,  . 
14 It is of course also possible to criticize t e r  t  i   
   . m  -
ti   t alization  isal,  . . E . ,  ). 
i   r   ili ili t 
t  f t l ri t  r  f l r t ti  l i  i  t ll  . 
IS Jacobus tenBroek stated his view iliat ilie Equal Protection Clause "was a confirma-
t   t  t  i ti  t   t     ili i  l  
t  t  f ll t t   t l i t .  ,  I  I I  
   E T  ).  t  ili t  
         l i ," t ti al 
  ,   i ilit " s. 
390 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
sis, take a more limited view of such rights or desire to limit or eschew
the notion altogether.
6
In spite of this controversy and the lack of a clear test for fundamen-
tal rights, a persuasive case can be made that one right as yet unidentified
by the courts and most other authorities should have the status of a
"fundamental right" for Equal Protection purposes, even by the most
restrictive standards of interpretation. This right is the right to the equal
benefit of laws protecting personal security.
A. Fundamental Rights and the Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court first applied a "fundamental rights" analysis under
the Equal Protection Clause in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.'
7
Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). He noted approvingly that the Court,
"in identifying those fundamental interests whose invasion would trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny of legislation" treated the clause broadly as a "substantive guarantee" of
such values and as relating to "more than racial equality." Id. at 26. See also Terrance
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1184 (1977)
(asserting in general and in wide-ranging terms that "constitutional law must now be
understood as the means by which effect is given to those ideas that from time to time
are held to be fundamental in defining the limits and distribution of governmental power
in our society"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITU-
TION 73-80 (1991).
16John Hart Ely has suggested that the Court better serves equal protection values by
invalidating classificatory statutes only when there is reason to infer that those disadvan-
taged by them have been "unable to participate effectively in the usual pluralist give-and-
take." John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Funda-
mental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 7 (1978). He seems to conclude that "fundamental
rights" jurisprudence cannot be applied in a principled way independent of a judge's
private values. Id. at 54-55.
Ira Lupu has argued that "[cilaims of nontextual substantive right [should] always be
due process claims," maintaining that the Equal Protection Clause, on the other hand,
"points to judicial protection against certain limited kinds of 'class legislation' and.,.
no further." Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 981, 1055, 1075 (1979); See also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
166-92 (1977); John E. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J.
1071, 1093-94 (1974) (proposing that statutes limiting "the exercise of a fundamental right
by a class of persons," unless the class is defined by race, be subject to an intermediate
standard of review rather than "strict scrutiny"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme
Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61
VA. L. REv. 945, 1017 (1975) (criticizing the Court's "seemingly ad hoc elevation of
fundamental rights and values").
For some time now, Equal Protection decisions of the Supreme Court have not been
generous in discerning new fundamental rights. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (no fundamental right to education per se); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no fundamental right to education per se). Analogous cases
have arisen in the due process context. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (plurality opinion) (no fundamental right for a natural father to parent a child born
to a mother who is married to another man); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
17316 U.S. 535 (1942).
[Vol. 29
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In that case, an Oklahoma statute provided that persons who had been
convicted two or more times of felonies involving moral turpitude could
be subjected to involuntary sterilization. 18 The statute provided an excep-
tion to this provision for "offenses arising out of the violation of the pro-
hibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses. ' 19 Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, declared that the legislation at issue
"involves one of the basic civil rights of man," since "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."20 He did not, however, go on to invalidate the imposition of ster-
ilization in all cases as violative of the Due Process Clause; 21 the holding
was instead grounded exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause applied because the statute's excep-
tion-for offenses such as tax violations and embezzlement-created two
classes of felons that were treated differently. That is, people repeatedly
convicted of embezzlement were exempt from sterilization, whereas peo-
ple repeatedly convicted of larceny or fraud were subject to sterilization.
22
The Court declared that such a classification in the case of a sterilization
law must be subjected to the strict scrutiny test 23 and ultimately decided
that the law could not pass the test. Strict scrutiny applied because the
law implicated a fundamental civil right. 24
Procreation has remained a part of the Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
25
for example, the Court considered the validity of various Massachusetts
statutes that in many cases prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried, but not to married, persons. 26 The Court invalidated this mari-
tal classification under the Equal Protection Clause, asserting "the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child?' 27 The Eisenstadt decision
determined that the Massachusetts laws failed even the most minimal
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause28 and so did not specifically
18 id. at 536.191d. at 537.
20 d. at 541.
21 The due process argument had been advanced, but the Court expressly declined to
address it, id. at 538, and noted that it would not use the facts of the case to "reexamine
the scope of the police power of the States." Id. at 541.221d. at 538-39.
231d. at 541.241d. at 541.
25405 U.S. 438 (1972).
2 6 The statutes generally allowed the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
when provided or prescribed by a registered physician and to married or unmarried persons
when their use was intended to prevent the spread of disease, as opposed to pregnancy.
Id. at 441-42.271d. at 453.
28 d. at 447.
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use the strict scrutiny test associated with classifications impairing funda-
mental rights. The Court's language clearly indicated the fundamental
character of decisions regarding procreation, however, for equal protec-
tion purposes. Moreover, the Court cited Skinner with approval.
29
In Shapiro v. Thompson,30 the Court acknowledged the fundamental
right to interstate travel. The Court invalidated statutes of various states
and the District of Columbia that conditioned the receipt of welfare
benefits on residency requirements. The statutes essentially created two
classes of potential welfare recipients: those who had been residents in
their state for a year or more, and those who had been residents for less
than a year.31 The Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, noted that
"[t]he constitutional right to travel from one State to another... 'occupies
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union."' 32 The Court
acknowledged that no particular provision of the Constitution contained
an express mention of this fundamental right33 but declared its existence
nonetheless. The Court then concluded that the statutes' one-year resi-
dency requirement "serves to penalize the exercise of that right" and,
"unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional. ' 34 The Court found that all the statutes failed
the strict scrutiny test 35 and, accordingly, struck them down as violative
of equal protection.
Obviously, not all assertions of fundamental rights under the Equal
Protection Clause find favor with the Court. One noteworthy example is
the purported right to education, which the Court has repeatedly refused
to recognize as fundamental. In San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez,36 Mexican-American parents instituted a class action on
behalf of all Texas schoolchildren who were indigent and resided in
school districts having a low property tax base.37 The trial court found for
the plaintiffs, holding in part that education is a fundamental right under
the Equal Protection Clause, and that the Texas property-tax system of
financing public education impaired the access of poor children to this
fundamental right.
38
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the lower court's fundamental
rights analysis unpersuasive. 39 Although the Court agreed that education is
291d. at 453-54.
30394 U.S. 618 (1969).
311d. at 627.
321d. at 630 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).33 Id. ("We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to
a particular constitutional provision.").341d. at 634.
351d. at 634-42.
36411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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"'perhaps the most important function of state and local governments, ' ' 40
it cautioned that "the importance of a service performed by the State does
not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes
of examination under the- Equal Protection Clause."41 Rather, the key for
determining whether a right is fundamental for this purpose is whether
the right is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 42
Finding no such explicit or implicit guarantee to education, the Court
declined to apply strict scrutiny to the property-tax finance system43 and
upheld it against the equal protection challenge.
44
No generally accepted rule exists for determining which rights should
be categorized as "fundamental" for equal protection purposes. In Skin-
ner, for example, the Court seemed to determine subjectively that pro-
creation is "one of the basic civil rights of man,"45 although procreation
is nowhere mentioned as such in the Constitution. The Court also subjec-
tively attached importance to the "subtle, far-reaching and devastating
effects" 46 of sterilization. In Shapiro, the Court was similarly unperturbed
by the lack of any mention in the Constitution of a fundamental right to
travel,47 and the one-year delay in welfare payments would not seem to
occasion the same kind of "far-reaching and devastating effects" as ster-
ilization.
48
Other authorities have noted the possibility of finding a fundamental
right to travel implicitly in specific provisions of the Constitution.49 How-
40 Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
41411 U.S. at 30.42 1d. at 33-34.
431d. at 44.
441d. at 55. The Court still maintains that education is not a fundamental right for
equal protection purposes. Nine years after Rodriguez, in Plyler, the Court again declared
that "public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution:' 457 U.S.
at 221.
45316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
46 Id.
47394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
48Although welfare payments are no doubt quite valuable to many recipients, there
are meaningful distinctions between the governmental actions in Shapiro and Skinner. The
residency requirements in Shapiro did not by their own operation make anyone residing
outside the relevant state worse off after, as opposed to before, their adoption. The
impediment would have arisen only when a person outside the state undertook to travel
to that state. After all, as is commonly noted, a state might well be able to eliminate
welfare programs altogether consistent with the interstate right to travel. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
1426 (7th ed. 1991). By contrast, the vasectomies and salpingectomies provided for in the
Skinner statute were affirmative acts of the state worked directly upon those complaining
about them. The disability would have arisen immediately, whether or not a person ever
decided subsequently to procreate. Moreover, the government actions threatened in Skinner
involve the kind of invasive procedures regarding one's physical person to which the Court
has accorded constitutional significance. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
49See TIBE, supra note 13, § 16-6 at 1455 n.3 (citing the Commerce Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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ever, it is not abundantly clear why a right to travel should be "implicit"
in certain provisions of the Constitution while a right to education should
not be implicit in others. For example, the plaintiffs in Rodriguez sug-
gested that a fundamental right to education might well be implicit in the
right to speak or the right to vote,50 and yet Rodriguez and subsequent
case law have consistently denied the existence of a fundamental right to
education. The insistence of the Rodriguez Court that the key to discov-
ering fundamental rights lies in assessing whether such a right is "explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" 51 is undercut by Skinner,
in which the discovery of the fundamental right to procreation was largely
subjective. Locating the right to procreation in the constitutional text was
of minimal importance.
The lack of a determinate test for fundamental rights can be readily
criticized. Justice Harlan put forth one of the more prominent criticisms
in his dissent to Shapiro.5 2 He considered strict scrutiny of laws impairing
fundamental rights to be an exception to the Court's general rule of
minimal scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and he worried that
the fundamental rights analysis "creates an exception which threatens to
swallow the standard equal protection rule. Virtually every state statute
affects important rights.153 Part of his concern seems to have been the
potentially broad sweep of fundamental rights.
Harlan's other concern was the "arbitrary or irrational" aspect of the
fundamental rights approach, because he knew "of nothing which entitles
this Court to pick out particular human activities, characterize them as
'fundamental,' and give them added protection" 54 He feared that the process
of choosing which rights were fundamental would of necessity be largely
arbitrary.5
5
Not all commentators consider the indeterminate scope of the funda-
mental rights branch of equal protection to be undesirable. For example,
Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff suggest that the process of determining
whether a particular action is protected by a fundamental right depends
on what level of generality is used to describe the asserted right.56 The
authors acknowledge that determining the appropriate level of generality
is an abstract enterprise that can result in more than one seemingly correct
answer,57 but this atmosphere of ambiguity does not deter them from
insisting that courts must engage "in the value-laden choice of a level of
50411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973).
5 1 Id. at 33.
52394 U.S. at 655-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
531d. at 661.
54 1d. at 662.
55See also Perry, supra note 14, at 1074-77.
56See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 15, at 73.5 7 See id. at 79-80.
[Vol. 29
HeinOnline -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 394 1994
 il    
tl      
     
  , 
l  ti   
te,50 t 
tl      
  li -
  t  titution"51 , 
   l   
  ti al  
l . 
   
  t  
iro.52      
 '    
l    
i    
i  t  
t ts."53   
ll    
l '  t    t  it   i ti l" t  t  
,   
   i   
ental,'  :'54  
    it   
 55 
  t  
        .  , 
 l r    
t l  
  5   
    
     
 57   
i i ti  t t rt  st  i  t  l -l  i  f  l l f 
5°411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973). 
51 [d.  . 
394 U.S. at 655-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
53 [d. t l. 
54 [d. t  
55 See also Perry, supra te , t - . 
56 See TRIBE  DORF, s r  t  ,   
57 See id. t - . 
1994] Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution 395
generality" that will in each case determine whether or not the asserted
fundamental right exists.58
B. The Fundamental Right of the Equal Benefit of Laws Protecting
Personal Security
The question of which rights should qualify as fundamental is impor-
tant because a state action that impairs a "fundamental right" must with-
stand strict scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny review is almost always fatal
for statutes subjected to it.
59
Regardless of the approach one adopts for discerning fundamental
rights under the Equal Protection Clause, a new fundamental right-the
right to the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security-must be
acknowledged. The recognition of this right would prevent the govern-
ment from invidiously discriminating in protecting its citizens from so-
cietal violence unless such discrimination withstands strict scrutiny-that
is, unless the discrimination is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.
60
To demonstrate why this right regarding personal security is funda-
mental, this Article adopts one of the most restrictive interpretations for
the recognition of fundamental rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
The interpretation was formulated by Professor Raoul Berger in two of
his books, Government by Judiciary and The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights. Even under Professor Berger's very restrictive interpre-
tation, the right of the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security
is fundamental for equal protection purposes. 61 Any other approach to
equal protection interpretation that acknowledges the fundamental rights
branch analysis would have a larger scope than Professor Berger's ap-
proach.62 Accordingly, a right found to be fundamental under his approach
should be viewed as fundamental under less restrictive approaches as
well.
58d. at 80.
5gThe most famous observation in this respect may be Gerald Gunther's statement
that strict scrutiny review could in some cases be viewed as "'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972).
60See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
61This Article does not necessarily take the position that this restrictive approach of
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause is correct for this or any other purpose. However,
if the restrictive approach results in discerning this particular fundamental right, any less
restrictive approach should do so as well.
62 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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1. Raoul Berger's Approach to the Fourteenth Amendment
In Government by Judiciary3 and The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights, 64 Professor Raoul Berger sketched 65 a particular view of
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment66 that dictates a narrow ap-
proach to discerning fundamental rights. Under Professor Berger's view,
the underlying purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
indeed to protect fundamental rights. Berger believes, however, that the
provision only protects those fundamental rights specifically listed67 in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.68
The 1866 Act listed the following rights for protection:
the ... right, in every State and Territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property .... 69
According to Berger, the Act was intended only to protect the rights it
mentioned by name,70 and it was only these specified rights that were to
be considered "fundamental" and protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, Section 1 and the Equal Protection Clause should only
63
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16.
64RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989)
[hereinafter BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT].
65Professor Berger's work in this area is not limited to the two books cited in the
text, see, e.g., Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Raoul Berger, Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983).
This Article takes no position on the incorporation debate.66 Professor Berger has not been completely alone in his position. See, e.g., Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV.
5 (1949); James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435 (1985). Nonetheless, Professor
Berger has been perhaps the most dedicated of the exponents of the approach he advances.
67 See BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 40-41. Sometimes
Berger's references support the idea that one or more of the particular clauses of Section
1 were designed to protect the rights considered "fundamental" under the 1866 Act. See
id. at 10 (the Due Process Clause); BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16,
at 28 (the Privileges and Immunities Clause). Other references, such as BERGER, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 41, suggest that Section I as a whole was
to have this effect.
68Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
69
1d.
70 BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 25, 41; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 28; see also THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 169 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTION
DEBATES] (remarks of Rep. Thayer on Mar. 1, 1866); Bond, supra note 66, at 446-47.
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apply to the rights to sue, to give evidence, to hold and convey real estate,
and to the other rights explicitly named in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.71
The basis for this approach is Berger's view of American political
history in the years immediately preceding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Following the 1865 adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment,
southern legislatures enacted statutory codes designed to keep the newly
freed African-Americans in a state of virtual peonage.72 For example,
some of these statutory codes, historically called "Black Codes," main-
tained pass systems that prohibited African-Americans from leaving their
place of employment without a pass from their employer, imposed penal-
ties on African-Americans who could not produce work permits or employ-
ment contracts on demand, restricted the extent to which African-Ameri-
cans could testify in court, prohibited African-American ownership of
firearms, and imposed other egregious limits on freedom.
73
Congress enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act in reaction to the Black
Codes.74 Congress wanted to invalidate in a single act of the federal
legislature all the abuses of the Black Codes passed by the various south-
ern legislatures. Indeed, the rights specifically listed in the 1866 Act
appear to have been designed to correct the most outrageous practices
under the codes. To many in Congress, however, it was unclear that the
federal government had the constitutional authority to pass the 1866 Act.
The Act pertained to the regulation of civil matters among residents of
each state, and in 1866 no constitutional provision specifically allowed
Congress to legislate on civil rights within a particular state.
In Berger's view, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 to
"constitutionalize" the 1866 Act.75 The use of the word "constitutionalize"
has two meanings in his theory: (1) the Amendment explicitly stated a
constitutional basis for the Act and therefore retroactively provided the
71 BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 25, 41; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 28.
72 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 1863-1877 198-201 (1988); James B.
Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, VOLUME
2: EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 103, 107, 109 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992)
[hereinafter EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION]; Donald G. Nieman, The Freedmen's
Bureau and the Mississippi Black Code, in EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra
at 556; Joe M. Richardson, Florida Black Codes, in EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUC-
TION, supra at 625, 632; see also Donald E. Reynolds, The New Orleans Riot of 1866,
Reconsidered, in THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, VOLUME 9: LYNCHING, RACIAL
VIOLENCE, AND LAW 248 n.4 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992).
73See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 70, at 171 (remarks of Rep.
Windom on Mar. 2, 1866); Nieman, supra note 72, at 558-61, 571-75; Richardson, supra
note 72, at 633-35.74 See, e.g., BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 23; see also
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988).
75 BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 23; see also Bond, supra
note 66, at 443-45, 448.
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constitutional authority for its enactment, and (2) by enshrining the prin-
ciples of the Act in a constitutional amendment, the Act was insulated
from legislative repeal.76 Given the coincidence of purpose he perceives
between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Act, Berger insists that
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to have no broader
scope than the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Accordingly, applying the Equal
Protection Clause (and the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses) to protect rights other than those specifically named in the 1866
legislation amounts to a judicial usurpation of legislative power.
77
In his writings, Berger cites speakers from the Congressional debates
on Reconstruction to demonstrate that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was meant to do no more than constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. The cited speakers readily refer to the specifically enumerated
rights in the Act as "fundamental" civil rights and assert that it is these
"fundamental" rights that the Act was meant to protect.78 Berger's theory
makes frequent use of the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment should
be read to protect these legislatively derived "fundamental rights '79 and
is, at least to this facial extent, consistent in linguistic terms with the
"fundamental rights" branch of current equal protection analysis devel-
oped by the courts. Berger's approach, however, implies the quite restric-
tive view that the scope of the "fundamental rights" so protected is limited
to the rights stated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
2. The Equal Benefit of Laws Protecting Personal Security
This Article assumes for the purpose of argument the correctness of
Professor Berger's view. Accordingly, the "fundamental rights" that the
Equal Protection Clause protects are assumed to be those fundamental
civil rights named in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Certain of the fundamental rights listed in the 1866 Act focused on
rights of legal and economic capacity, such as the rights to sue, give
evidence, and hold property. The treatment of freed African-Americans
under the Black Codes seemed to warrant special protection of these kinds
of rights.80 African-Americans during the Reconstruction period, and those
sympathetic to their cause, had yet another vital concern apart from legal
and economic capacity-protection from societal violence.
7 6 See BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 23.
77d. at 407-18.
7 8 See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 70, at 169 (remarks of Rep. Thayer
on Mar. 1-2, 1866).7 9 BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 10, 25; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 28, 36.80See, e.g., FONER, supra note 72, at 199-201 (especially regarding the restrictions
that Black Codes placed on the ability of African-Americans to contract for their labor),
[Vol. 29
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Freed African-Americans and their partisans during the Reconstruc-
tion period were frequently the victims of severe violence at the hands of
their opponents.81 Law enforcement agencies and the courts in the south-
ern states did not punish assailants of African-Americans similarly to
assailants of whites82 and punished African-Americans more severely for
crimes than whites.83 Congress was aware of the situation, and the Re-
publicans were duly outraged. For this reason, the list of fundamental
rights protected in the Civil Rights Act included the right to the "full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property."
' 4
African-Americans continued to live in a climate of violence and
physical oppression. An 1866 Joint House and Senate Committee Report
on the progress of Reconstruction noted:
The feeling in many portions of the country towards emancipated
slaves, especially among the uneducated and ignorant, is one of
vindictive and malicious hatred. This deep-seated prejudice against
color is assiduously cultivated by the public journals, and leads
to acts of cruelty, oppression, and murder, which the local
authorities are at no pains to prevent or punish.
85
Earlier in the year, speakers in Congress noted with indignation that in
some localities houses had been burned and African-Americans had been
81 See, e.g., BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 85 ("the
mischief was violence in the South, from which citizens must be protected .. . save the
freedman from lynching"); id. at 111 ('The life of the emancipated black was being
threatened and often taken in the South."). See Barry Crouch, A Spirit of Lawlessness:
White Violence; Texas Blacks, 1865-1868, in EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra
note 72, at 126, 132 ('Texas whites often killed blacks for no obvious reason other than
racial hatred or the satisfaction of sadistic fantasies?').
82 See, e.g., FONER, supra note 72, at 121 ("In the face of this pervasive violence, local
leaders of society and politics remained silent, reluctant to hold other whites responsible
for crimes against blacks:'). The following passage appears in a study of the Florida
"Black Codes": "In Lake City two Negroes were convicted of stealing two boxes of goods
from a railroad company and were fined $500. When they could not pay they were sold
to the highest bidder. A few months later a White man was convicted of an unprovoked
murder of a Negro; he was fined $225 and sentenced to one minute imprisonment. In
Alachua County three freedmen were charged with violation of contract and were
sentenced to be publicly whipped. They also forfeited their wages and had to pay court
costs. In Marianna a White man was convicted of assaulting a freedwoman and fined five
cents:' Richardson, supra note 72, at 636.
83Nieman, supra note 72, at 568 (noting an observation by Ulysses S. Grant that some
state courts punished freedmen for "offenses for which white persons are not punished in
the same manner and degree"); Richardson, supra note 72, at 634 (listing a set of greater
punishments for African-Americans than for whites for apparently similar or identical
offenses).
84 BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 111.
85S. REP. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1866), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION
DEBATES, supra note 70, at 94.
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murdered.8 6 The laws imposed by the southern states were termed in
Congressional debate to be "barbaric" and the treatment the laws pre-
scribed to be "inhuman."87 Members of Congress seemed especially moved
by reports that violators of the pass system were subject to summary
flogging and whipping merely for being in transit without a pass.88 Indeed,
it was claimed during political discussions in the North that African-
Americans could be summarily flogged for any infraction if they lacked
the money to pay the established fine.
8 9
Perhaps most dramatically, in the spring of 1866, well-reported and
much-reviled massacres of large groups of newly freed African-Ameri-
cans by outraged white mobs occurred in Memphis in April and in New
Orleans in June.90 Whites were at risk as well as African-Americans; it
was claimed during the 1866 elections that Southerners were waging "a
war of actual extermination by systematic murder of the Union men of
the South."91 Such reports and events caused concern among sympathetic
members of Congress for the physical safety of African-Americans and
their allies.92 Especially galling to Congress was that the oppressors in
these situations frequently escaped punishment:
Thousands and tens of thousands of harmless black men, from
the Potomac to the Rio Grande, have been wronged and outraged
by violence, and hundreds upon hundreds have been murdered
... . The local authorities screen the murderers; the people
protest against the punishment of white men for the murder of
black men, and the murderers go unpunished.
93
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction complained that "local authorities
are at no pains to punish" assaults and killings of African-Americans,
94
that a military report to the President contained the observations that
"outrages have been committed upon negroes which have been allowed
to go unpunished," that "illegal combinations of men" had been organized
861d. at 131 (remarks of Rep. Eliot on Jan. 30, 1866); id. at 149 (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull on Feb. 20, 1866).871d. at 164 (remarks of Rep. Wilson on Mar. 1, 1866).
881d. at 171 (remarks' of Rep. Windom on Mar. 2, 1866); id. at 199 (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull on Apr. 4, 1866).
89 See Bond, supra note 66, at 443 n.52 (quoting an editorial in The Bedford Inquirer,
a Pennsylvania newspaper).901d. at 444; see also Reynolds, supra note 72.
91 Bond, supra note 66, at 446 (quoting a speech of Congressman Samuel Shellabarger
reported in The Delaware Gazette, an Ohio newspaper).92 See BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at I 11.9 3 RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 70, at 171 (remarks of Sen. Wilson on Mar.
2, 1866).941d. at 94.
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to drive African-Americans from their state, "and [that] such persons are
allowed to act with impunity.' 95
It was undoubtedly to meet these concerns that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 included the phrase "the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property" within its list of
protected rights. This "fundamental right" was then incorporated, under
Berger's view, into the protections of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Among the provisions of Section 1, the Equal Protection Clause was
probably designed to insure this fundamental right of equal benefit of laws
protecting personal security. The similarity of the language between this
phrase in the Act and the Equal Protection Clause would suggest as much,
as commentators have asserted.9 6 Even assuming the restrictive approach
to equal protection interpretation implicit in the Berger analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause protects against gov-
ernment classifications that punish one person less than another for the
same offense and classifications that punish less when the victim is of
one class rather than another.
It is not necessary to adopt Professor Berger's approach to accept the
validity of this finding. Even if one is skeptical of Berger's view that
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment did nothing more than constitu-
tionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the importance of the contemporary
congressional statements identifying the "equal benefit of' laws "for the
security of person and property" as a fundamental right must be acknow-
ledged.97 If the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment con-
sidered this kind of equal protection to be a fundamental right, one does
not need to be a follower of Professor Berger to agree that it should be
so considered in the context of modern equal protection analysis as well.
II. Hate Crimes and Homosexuals
The subject of hate crimes increasingly drew the attention of civil
rights and other advocacy groups in the 1980s. Certain organizations,
including the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the Southern Pov-
erty Law Center, and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, began to
951d. at 149 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull on Feb. 20, 1866).9 6 See, e.g., BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 64, at 144 ("When
the framers and Ratifiers spoke of equal protection it was against such violence [flogging,
murder and terrorism] that they meant to protect the helpless blacks.'); BERGER, GovER-
MENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 174 ("'[The Equal Protection Clause] prohibits the
hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects
the black man in his fundamental rights ... with the same shield which it throws over
the white man."' (quoting remarks of Sen. Howard)).97 See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
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keep statistics and issue regular reports on the incidence and nature of
hate crime.98 Legislative activity during this period, both at the state and
national levels, reflected these concerns.
Throughout the 1980s, many states enacted state-wide hate crime
statutes. At the end of the decade, the federal government adopted the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990. 91 Legislative efforts in Congress to
adopt a substantive sentence-enhancement hate crime statute are also
continuing. 00 Although gay men and lesbians are among the more fre-
quent victims of hate crimes, a significant number of the state enactments
have excluded homosexual men and women from their coverage.
A. Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime as a Societal Phenomenon
Before discussing the statistical incidence of hate crime and review-
ing representative anti-homosexual hate crimes, a brief specification of
precisely what is meant by "hate crime" is in order. Commentators can
refer indiscriminately to a varied array of behavior as "hate crimes"' 10 1
Nevertheless, analytical clarity is improved by defining specifically what
one means by the phrase. The mere utterance of words or phrases to
someone, communicated in a way not tending to instill fear or intimida-
tion in the hearer, can under some conceptions of the phrase result in a
"hate crime?" 02 This Article does not adopt such a broad approach. In-
stead, this Article adopts the definition promulgated by the FBI pursuant
to its authority under the 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Act. 103 The FBI's
Uniform Crime Reports Section (the "UCR") has defined a hate crime as
9SThe Anti-Defamation League has published its annual Audit of Anti-Semitic Inci-
dents since 1979. The Southern Poverty Law Center's Klanwatch Project has published a
regular newsletter listing hate crime incidents since 1981. The National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force established its Anti-Violence Project in 1982 and began regular data collection
reports in 1985. Jacobs & Eisler, The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 29 CRIM. L. BULL.
99, 100-01 (1993).
99Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
100E.g., H. R. 4092, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1701 (1994), S. 1522, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993).
101 For example, the Los Angeles Times reported that Harvey Saferstein, the President
of the California Bar Association, has compared "jokes against attorneys to hate speech
against African-Americans" and that he "favors classifying such comments as hate
crimes." Vicki Torres, Chief of Bar Association Asks End to Lawyer-Bashing, L.A. TIMES,
July 6, 1993, at Al. Whether or not this reporting is an accurate reflection of Mr.
Saferstein's intent, the usage in the newspaper article indicates at least the reporter's view
that bad jokes can amount to hate crimes.
1021t has not been uncommon, particularly in the earlier stages of their data collection
efforts, for advocacy groups to include incidents of "verbal abuse" among their hate crime
statistics. See, e.g., NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY VIOLENCE, VICTIhiu-
ZATION & DEFAMATION IN 1989 app. A, table 1 (1990). While verbal abuse can in some
cases constitute criminal behavior if it meets certain criteria, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), it is not always clear in such reports that the catalogued
incidents satisfied such criteria.
103 Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, § l(b)(1), (2), (5), 104 Stat. 140,
(1990).
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a "criminal offense committed against a person or property, which is
motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion,
ethnic/national origin group, or sexual orientation group?"1
04
This approach requires the commission of a predicate crime for a
"hate crime" to occur and does not allow for the creation of a new crime
resulting merely from intimidating speech. Intimidating speech might in
some cases be criminally punishable. 10 5 This Article, however, focuses on
statutes that provide supplemental punishment for violent crimes commit-
ted because of societal prejudice to the victim.
1. Statistical Overview
Currently available statistics on hate crime as a national phenomenon
are of limited reliability. This is due in part to the relative newness of the
national hate crime data collection effort. Regardless of these limitations,
however, it appears from the information available that hate crime is
widespread geographically throughout the United States and constitutes a
significant and persistent element of national criminal activity. Hate crimes
against homosexuals, in turn, constitute a substantial proportion of the
national hate crime phenomenon.
a. General National Hate Crime Reporting
The FBI's first two yearly reports of national hate crime statistics
were for calendar years 1991 and 1992. The reports listed 4755 hate crime
offenses for 1991 and 8918 such offenses for 1992.106 These figures would
appear to be very small when compared with national figures for all types
of crime during the corresponding years indexed by the FBI.107 The total
numbers of index crime offenses reported nationally by the UCR for 1991
and 1992108 as compared with the foregoing figures from the FBI's hate
crime reports for those two years, are shown in Table 1.
104 FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTING GUIDELINES (1990),
reprinted in Jacobs & Eisler, supra note 98, at 104.
05 For example, even under the United States Supreme Court's holding in R.A.V v.
City of St. Paul, the criminalization of certain utterances would be permissible as long as
the proscription were content-neutral. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
106 FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1992 HATE CRIMES 3 [hereinafter 1992 FBI REPORT];
FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRESS RELEASE 1 [hereinafter 1991 FBI REPORT].
107The FBI has been keeping statistics on national criminal activity through the UCR
program since 1930, chiefly by tabulating information relating to specified "index crimes."
FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1992 1 (1993) [hereinafter
1992 UCR REPORT]. The current index crimes are murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
arson. Id.
°81d. at 5; FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1991 5 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 UCR REPORT].
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Table 1 Hate Crimes Reported to FBI and Index Crimes - 1991 and 1992
Year Hate Crime Offenses Index Crime Offenses
1991 4755 14,872,883
1992 8918 14,438,191
The FBI's hate crime figures probably underestimate the actual inci-
dence of hate crime. First, certain inefficiencies in enforcement result
from the relative newness of the Hate Crime Statistics Act. The national
UCR program has been in effect since 1930, whereas the first year of
operation of the Hate Crime Statistics Act was 1991. Incomplete effec-
tuation would seem normal in early years of the Act's operation. 09
Second, the FBI's statistics underestimate the incidence of hate crimes
because it is evident that the reporting on which the statistics are based
has been incomplete. Each report was less than five full pages in length,
and each consisted merely of four paragraphs of text followed by four
charts. 10 The reports contained only the most minimal analysis and did
not reflect numerical totals for all fifty states."' Law enforcement agen-
cies from only thirty-two states submitted data for the 1991 report, al-
though there was increased involvement in 1992, with agencies from
forty-one states and the District of Columbia reporting. 12
Even the data submitted by those states that did report numerical
figures were probably unreliable: in the 1992 study, for example, several
states reported figures that seem unrealistically low,"3 and of the forty-
two reporting states or jurisdictions in that study, thirteen registered par-
ticipation by five or fewer law enforcement agencies state-wide. 114
To follow up on its initial 1991 report, the FBI in December 1992,
published a hate crime statistics Resource Book," 5 which compiled for the
109Some police departments are already well-versed in hate crime reporting and
policing. For some time city police departments in New York and San Francisco have
maintained their own bias crime units, and the practice is spreading to some suburban
departments. See Art Barnum, Minority Hiring, Hate Crimes Top Issues Among Police
Chiefs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1991, at 1; James C. McKinley, Jr., Tracking Crimes of
Prejudice: A Hunt for the Elusive Truth, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1990, at Al; Lucia Mouat,
Units Set Up to Counter Bias-Related Crime, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 19, 1990,
at 8.
1101992 FBI REPORT, supra note 106, at 1-5; 1991 FBI REPORT, supra note 106, at
1-4.
111 See 1992 FBI REPORT, supra note 106, at 5; 1991 FBI REPORT, supra note 106, at
4.
12 The nonparticipating states for the 1992 report were Alaska, Hawaii, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. 1992
FBI REPORT, supra note 106, at 5.
11Id. Examples include Alabama (4 incidents), Kansas (3 incidents), Mississippi (0
incidents) and North Carolina, and North Dakota (1 incident each). These could compare
with states such as Colorado (258 incidents), Iowa (37 incidents), and Missouri (158
incidents).
114 Id.
"'FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 1990: A RESOURCE BOOK
(1992) [hereinafter RESOURCE BOOK].
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IISFBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 1990:  RES RCE  
(1992) [hereinafter RES RCE K]. 
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calendar year 1990 information from eleven states that are among those
with the most highly developed hate crime reporting procedures. 16 The
Resource Book was substantially more detailed than either the 1991 or
1992 statistical reports. The hate crime incidents reported by the eleven
states in this publication totalled 4371.117 Even accounting for the differ-
ent year, this eleven-state figure confirms the relative unreliability of the
1991 and 1992 nationwide totals calculated by the FBI. Moreover, it is
worth noting that the detailed eleven-state Resource Book report excluded
such populous states as California, Illinois, and Texas.
Although the Resource Book only pertains to eleven states, it tends
to prove that hate crime as a phenomenon is geographically widespread.
For example, in 1990, New York and New Jersey reported 1100 and 824
incidents, respectively;1 8 Pennsylvania reported 194;119 Florida reported
258;120 Minnesota reported 309;121 and Oregon reported 343.122 These
figures indicate that the hate crime phenomenon is not narrowly localized
in particular parts of the country.
Even though the 8918-offense figure from the 1992 FBI nationwide
report seems relatively small when compared with total UCR crime figures
for 1992, it still appears significant when compared with particular subsets
of crime reported for 1992. For example, the nationwide total for the
murder of African-American victims over the age of seventeen in 1992
was 9820 incidents;123 the number of murders reported in 1992 in the
Southern United States region was 9195;124 and the number of murders
for the year nationwide committed with weapons other than handguns was
10,051.125 The relative proximity of these numbers suggests that hate
crimes constitute a significant factor in nationwide criminal behavior in
light of the substantial underreporting that occurs.
The Hate Crimes Statistics Act has been criticized for perceived
underinclusiveness of its protected categories and for definitional prob-
lems its enforcement may entail.126 One pair of commentators has gone
so far as to declare their certainty that "the Act will fail to produce an
accurate or comprehensive picture of hate crime in America '1 27 Such
"
6The 11 states were Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
" 7 See RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 115, at 12, 17, 24, 30, 37, 44, 50, 56, 61, 65, 69
(reflecting subtotals for each reported state).




2 1 d. at 37.
122id. at 56.
12 1992 UCR REPORT, supra note 107, at 16.
124Id. at 211.
12Id. at 18.
126See generally Jacobs & Eisler, supra note 98.
127 Id. at 122.
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conclusions may be overly pessimistic. 128 But even accepting these criti-
cisms, it does not follow that the phenomenon of hate crime is itself
insignificant or trivial and does not require the conclusion that govern-
ments should do nothing to address the problem.
The federal effort under the Statistics Act is not the only national
survey of hate crime statistics. Prominent among the private projects is
the annual Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents,129 which has been published
by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (the "ADL") throughout
the past fifteen years. 130 For 1993, the ADL reported 1867 anti-Semitic
incidents, of which 788 were vandalism and 1079 were "harassment,
threats or assault.'1" 31 The greatest number of incidents occurred in New
York, New Jersey, Florida, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Illi-
nois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 32 These nine states, located in geographi-
cally diverse sections of the country, accounted for 1408 of the 1867
incidents. The reporting of private projects also challenges the FBI's
statistics for hate crimes in 1992. For example, in 1992, the ADL's Audit
ofAnti-Semitic Incidents reported a total of 1730 anti-Semitic incidents. 33
The total figure in 1992 for anti-gay and -lesbian hate crimes reported by
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) was 1898.134 By
contrast, the 1992 FBI report lists 1084 anti-Semitic offenses and 928
anti-homosexual offenses for that year.135 These figures constitute less
than two-thirds and less than half, respectively, of the above 1992 figures
reported by the ADL and the NGLTF. In comparing the FBI figures with
the private agency figures, it should be noted that the agencies have been
monitoring hate crimes for substantial periods of time. 136 Of course, there
are incongruities between the three sets of figures (the FBI figures account
for offenses whereas the agencies accounted for incidents, 3 7 for example).
12SUnderinclusiveness of protected categories can be addressed through amendment
or interpretation. See infra part III.
1
29
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, 1993 AUDIT OF ANTI-SEMITIC
INCIDENTS (1994) [hereinafter 1993 ADL AUDIT].
130 d. at 1.
1311d.
1321d. at 26.
133 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, 1992 AUDIT OF ANTI-SEMITIC
INCIDENTS 3 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 ADL AUDIT].
13
4
NGLTF POLICY INSTITUTE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, VICTIMIZATION &
DEFAMATION IN 1992 3 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 NGLTF REPORT].
1351992 FBI REPORT, supra note 106, at 2.
136As noted above, the history of the ADL Audits of Anti-Semitic Violence spans 15
years, and the NGLTF began monitoring anti-homosexual violence in 1985.
137An offense can be defined as a specific type of conduct (such as "assault" or
"vandalism"), whereas an incident can be viewed as one or more offenses that occur as a
single unit of experience (a person who is assaulted while entering her car, as the assailant
vandalizes the exterior of the car, has experienced one incident consisting of two offenses).
See, e.g., 1992 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 134, at 47.
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INCIDENTS (1994) [hereinafter   DIT]. 
130 Id. at . 
13 I . 
132 Id. at . 
133 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, 1992 IT F I- I I  
INCIDENTS 3 (1993) [hereinafter   IT]. 
134NGLTF POLICY INSTITUTE, ANTI-GAy/LESBIAN I LE CE, I I I I   
DEFAMATION IN 19923 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 TF T]. 
135 1992 FBI REpORT, slIpra note 106, at 2. 
136 As noted above, the history of the ADL Audits of Anti-Semitic Violence spans 15 
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However, even allowing for such discrepancies, this comparison should
constitute a further indication of the incompleteness of the FBI's 8918-
offense figure.
The current state of the hate crime record-keeping effort does not yet
permit absolutely reliable figures for annual national totals for all types
of hate crime. Yet it is evident that hate crime is a geographically wide-
spread, persistent pattern of criminal behavior of significant proportions.
b. Reporting of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime
The reporting of hate crimes against lesbians and gay men has been
subject to the same logistical difficulties as the reporting of hate crimes in
general. The data that are available, however, indicate that hate crimes against
homosexuals, like those against other groups, are widespread, persistent,
and significant.
NGLTF has been conducting the most detailed national review of hate
crimes against homosexuals."l 8 From 1985 to 1989, NGLTF gathered infor-
mation from a wide range of local community groups, researchers, and
media sources to compile its own figures of anti-homosexual hate crime
across the country.139 Since 1990, NGLTF reports have focused on key
major metropolitan areas throughout the country. 140 The 1993 report con-
centrates on Boston, Chicago, Denver, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York
City, and San Francisco. 141 NGLTF focuses on these cities because "they
are the sites of professionally staffed agencies that monitor anti-gay vio-
lence and provide assistance to lesbian, gay and bisexual crime survi-
vors." 142
The 1993 NGLTF survey reflected totals for anti-homosexual of-
fenses in the six cities for the year as shown in Table 2.143
Several points regarding these figures are necessary for clarification.
For example, NGLTF has defined "harassment" as "using language or
138NGLTF is a civil rights organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. with a
current membership of 32,000. NGLTF POLICY INSTITUTE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE,
VICTIMIZATION & DEFAMATION IN 1993 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 NGLTF REPORT]. It was
founded in 1973 to promote "freedom and full equality" for lesbians and gay men. NGLTF
has been conducting annual surveys of anti-homosexual violence since 1985. See ANTI-
GAY VIOLENCE, VICTIMIZATION & DEFAMATION IN 1989, supra note 102, at 1.
139
NGLTF POLICY INSTITUTE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, VICTIMIZATION &
DEFAMATION IN 1990 4 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 NGLTF REPORT].1401d.
141The 1990 report included Los Angeles among the cities surveyed, but Los Angeles
has not been included in subsequent reports. Denver is a new addition, being emphasized
in the 1993 report for the first time. The remaining five cities have been the subject of
consistent focus during this period.
1421993 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 138, at 6.
14 3 d. at App. A.
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gestures to show malice or hatred" and has defined a "threat" as "placing
another person in reasonable fear of bodily harm."'44 Not all incidents of
"harassment" so defined, would constitute a crime under many state
criminal codes. NGLTF has acknowledged the possibility that not all of
its reported incidents and offenses would constitute crimes for FBI report-
ing purposes.145 Since not all incidents reported amount to conventionally
defined criminal behavior, some might minimize the importance of the
NGLTF findings.




Physical Assault/Objects Thrown 710






Kidnapping, Extortion, other 82
It would be unfair to substantially discount such results on this basis.
Organizations such as NGLTF do not pretend that the figures they accu-
mulate are a precise reflection of numbers of offenses or incidents that
actually occur.146 Such figures can be at best approximations of criminal
behavior patterns, since many factors combine to undermine precision.
First, as will be developed later in this Article, hate crimes in general and
anti-homosexual hate crimes in particular are greatly underreported, both
to community organizations and to police. 47 Second, there will always be
difficulties in determining the anti-homosexual character of the attackers'
1441992 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 134, at 13 n.1/4.
1
45 Id. at 4 n.1.
146See, e.g., 1993 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 138, at 6 ("Neither police nor
community-based agencies claims their data reflect all or even most of the anti-gay
incidents that occur locally.").147The 1993 report by NGLTF indicates that the police departments of the six major
cities reported a total of 322 anti-homosexual crimes for 1993, as opposed to NGLTF's
own national figures of 1813 incidents and over 3400 offenses. The report noted that the
much lower number was due in part to the occurrence of some crimes outside city limits
(the city police would not include such crimes, but the community groups would), as well
as the non-criminal character of some of the incidents reported by the community groups.
Id. at 10-11.
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motivations.148 Third, reporting in this area may be affected by the sub-
jective perceptions of those reporting, both victims and agency personnel.
While some reporting procedures may overstate criminal patterns
(such as including some non-criminal behavior in incident reports), and
others may understate them (such as the reluctance of victims to report
and geographical limits on data received), general patterns nevertheless
emerge. In particular, useful indications of the prevalence of societal
hostility are likely to come to light, since the total figures from year to
year are subject to the same logistical distortions.
149
With respect to the persistence of anti-homosexual hate crime, the
1993 NGLTF report contains a useful comparison of dataP50 from the five
major cities that have consistently reported over the previous six years.
(See Table 3.)









Although the annual data appear to show an upward trend in the
quantity of anti-homosexual incidents over the five years followed by a
moderate downturn in 1993, NGLTF believes that this apparent pattern
reflects a variety of factors. For example, the apparent increases from
1988 to 1992 may reflect increased activism by community groups in
seeking out victims, and an increased readiness by victims to report these
incidents.15' Similarly, the NGLTF has stated that it is not possible to infer
a general downward trend from the apparent decline in 1993, and noted
148See, e.g., id. at 10. The groups that report to NGLTF have developed objective
criteria for determining when an incident was motivated by anti-homosexual prejudice,
such as the character of any language or particular objects used in the attack, the location
of the incident, and whether the victim was engaged in advocacy at the time of the attack.
The FBI uses similar lists, see Jacobs & Eisler, supra note 98, at 108-12, although as
noted by Jacobs and Eisler, such lists can be criticized.
'49See 1993 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 138, at 6 ("The consistent and ongoing nature
of their monitoring efforts makes it possible to examine annual trends in reporting by
victims").
1501d. at 9.
15t 1992 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 134, at 3. Historically, the NGLTF has been
reluctant to attribute increases in reported incidents solely to increasing frequency of
attacks, acknowledging that increased willingness to report incidents has an important
effect as well. E.g., NGLTF POLICY INSTITUTE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, VICTIMI-
ZATION & DEFAMATION IN 1991 13 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 NGLTF REPORT]; 1990
NGLTF REPORT, supra note 139, at 4.
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that while the number of incidents reported in that year declined, their
severity increased.
152
Even though patterns in reported incidents may not necessarily or
accurately reflect commensurate increases or decreases in the numbers of
crimes actually committed, the yearly numbers indicate the persistence of
hate crimes against homosexuals. NGLTF materials demonstrate that anti-
homosexual hate crime is no less persistent, widespread, or significant
than hate crime in general. The cities reflected in the reports are located
in geographically diverse areas. The total number of 1993 incidents re-
ported by NGLTF (1813) seems generally commensurate with the 1993
total reported by the ADL in its 1993 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents
(1867), and the same was true for the corresponding reports in 1992 (1898
and 1730, respectively).
2. Characteristics of Anti-Homosexual Violence
The foregoing numerical data demonstrate the widespread character
and persistence of hate crimes against lesbians and gay men. The full
significance of these types of hate crime cannot be described by a numeri-
cal overview. To gain a full appreciation of the nature of this kind of
crime, it is also vital to review representative incidents.
a. Gruesome Nature of Violence Inflicted
Attacks against lesbians and gay men because of their homosexuality
tend to be motivated by such extreme hatred that these incidents are
unusually bloody or gruesome. 153 According to one sociological study,
"[a]n intense rage is present in nearly all homicide cases involving gay
male victims. A striking feature . . . is their gruesome, often vicious
1521993 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 138, at 12.
153At a 1980 hearing conducted by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors on
anti-lesbian and -gay violence, a staff physician at a city medical center noted that
bias-motivated attacks against lesbians and gay men
are vicious in scope and the intent is to kill and maim .. . .Weapons include
knives, guns, brass knuckles, tire irons, baseball bats, broken bottles, metal
chains, and metal pipes. Injuries include severe lacerations requiring extensive
plastic surgery; head injuries, at times requiring surgery; puncture wounds of the
chest, requiring insertion of chest tubes; removal of the spleen for traumatic
rupture; multiple fractures of the extremities, jaws, ribs, and facial bones [and
many others].
GARY D. COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 46 (1991) (quoting
remarks of Dr. Stewart Flemming, of the emergency department at the Ralph E. Davies
Medical Center in San Francisco).
[Vol. 29
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nature. Seldom is the homosexual victim simply shot. He is more apt to
be stabbed a dozen or more times, mutilated and strangled'
54
Similarly, one New York City hospital official observed that "attacks
against gay men were the most heinous and brutal I encountered. They
frequently involved torture, cutting, mutilation, and beating, and showed
the absolute intent to rub out the human being because of his [sexual]
preference." 155 Statements confirming this point by observers in other
fields are not uncommon. 156 A recent and much-publicized example of this
pattern occurred in a military context overseas. On October 27, 1992,
Airman Terry Helvey, serving with the United States Navy on a ship
stationed in Sasebo, Japan, murdered his shipmate, Seaman Allen Schin-
dler. 57 Schindler had recently told his commander he was gay and wanted
an administrative discharge. Meanwhile, word of his homosexuality and
impending discharge spread throughout the ship's crew. Helvey and a
friend, who had both been drinking vodka and beer near a park just
outside the Sasebo United States Navy base, noticed Schindler walking
toward the park. Helvey suggested to his friend that they follow Schindler
and harass him. They noticed Schindler enter a restroom in the park, and
they followed him in.
The murder of Schindler was unprovoked and especially brutal. Helvey
later described how he had kneed Schindler in the groin, punched him in
the face, and cradled Schindler's neck and head in his left arm as he
punched him repeatedly in the face. Helvey said he then brought Schin-
dler down to the floor, where he stomped on his face and chest with his
154Brian Miller & Laud Humphreys, Lifestyles and Violence: Homosexual Victims of
Assault and Murder, 3 QUALITATIVE SOC. 169, 179 (1980), quoted in Kevin T. Berrill,
Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An Overview, 5 J. INTERPER-
SONAL VIOLENCE, 274, 279-80 (1990).
155Id. at 280 (quoting Melissa Mertz, Director of Victim Services at Bellevue
Hospital).
156 For example, in a 1965 study of autopsy findings by physicians, one psychiatrist
is quoted as saying that "multiple and extensive wounds are not uncommon in the fury
of" anti-homosexual murder. COMSTOCK, supra note 153, at 47 (quoting Frank W. Kiel,
The Psychiatric Character of the Assailant as Determined by Autopsy Observations of the
Victim, 10 J. FORENSIC Sci. 269 (1965)). A Miami homicide detective said that a beating
of two gay men in 1984 was "the worst beating I have ever seen." COMSTOCK, supra note
153, at 47 (quoting Gang Beats Two Gays, WASH. BLADE, July 27, 1984, at 8).
157The facts of the Schindler case are taken from H.G. Reza, Sailor Beaten to Death
May Have Been Victim of Gay-Bashing, Navy Says, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 9, 1993,
at A3; James Sterngold, Killer Discounts Homosexuality of His Victim, N.Y. TIMEs, May
27, 1993, at A8; James Sterngold, Killer Gets Life as Navy Says He Hunted Down Gay
Sailor, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at Al; James Sterngold, Killer of a Gay Sailor Is
Allowed Lesser Plea, Averting a Full Trial, N.Y. TnviES, May 24, 1993, at All [hereinafter
Stemgold, Killer of a Gay Sailor]; James Sterngold, Motive in Killing of Gay Sailor Is Left
Unclear in Penalty Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A16 [hereinafter Sterngold, Motive
in Killing]; James Sterngold, Navy Hearing on Killer's Penalty May Skirt Victim's Homosexu-
ality, N.Y. TIM1Es, May 25, 1993, at A17; James Sterngold, Navy to Charge Sailor with
Murder in a Slaying Some View as a Gay-Bashing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at A8.
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feet. Schindler was so disfigured by the beating that his mother could
recognize him only by the tattoos on his arms; the Navy said that his skull
was battered, that most of his ribs were broken, and that his penis was
cut. The physician who performed the autopsy said that Schindler's lungs
were bruised and his liver was completely destroyed: "If you took a
tomato and slushed it all up without damaging its skin, that's what it
would be like '158 Seasoned medics at the base hospital later said they
were sickened by the brutality of the beating. The brutal characteristics
of Schindler's murder are consistent with many anti-gay 'hate crimes,
wherein perpetrators evince "the absolute intent to rub out the human
being because of his sexual preference:" 59
Several well-publicized cases from recent years serve as further ex-
amples:
* In May 1988, Rebecca Wight and Claudia Brenner, a lesbian cou-
ple, were shot in cold blood by Stephen Ray Carr. The circumstances of
the case were particularly gruesome, and Carr was ultimately convicted
of first-degree murder.
160
* In May 1988, college freshman Richard Lee Bednarski murdered
two gay men, Tom Trimble and Lloyd Griffen, in cold blood in the Dallas
area. The case made national headlines, not only for the wanton character
of the crime but also for callous remarks the trial judge made about the
victims during Bednarski's sentencing.
161
158Stemgold, Motive in Killing, supra note 157.
159See text and note at note 155, supra. Helvey never admitted in open court that he
killed Schindler because he was gay and during oral testimony denied that such had been
his motive. No national authority reviewing the case, however, has asserted that the motive
was anything other than anti-gay hostility, and Helvey offered no other explanation.
160 See Victoria A. Brownsworth, Killer Sentenced to Life in Attack on Lesbian Hikers,
WKLY. NEWS, June 7, 1989, at 12; Jennie McKnight, Appalachian Trail Killer Sentenced
to Life, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, June 4-10, 1989, at 3; see also Claudia Brenner, Eight
Bullets, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
11-15 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONFRONTING
VIOLENCE]. The two women were on a camping trip in a deserted area of Pine Grove State
Park in Pennsylvania. On the second day of their trip, they were awakened by shotgun
blasts fired by Carr. He fired eight bullets. Brenner was hit five times-in the arms, face,
head, and neck. A shot through her cheek sliced her tongue and traveled down her throat.
Wight was also hit and ultimately bled to death from a shot to the torso that ripped through
her chest cavity. Brenner survived the attack and, after a remarkable 3.7-mile trek to obtain
help while suffering from serious wounds, was instrumental in the successful prosecution
of Carr for first-degree murder. Id.
161 See Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of 71vo Homosexuals, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1988, at 8; Kevin Gerrity, On Life's Dark Underside, the Evil of Gay
Bashing, KAN. CITY TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al, A13. Bednarski drove with a group of
friends to a neighborhood of Dallas, Texas, known for its large homosexual population.
Their express purpose was to pose as homosexuals so as to facilitate a physical assault of
any gay men who might take an interest in them. They were invited into a car by Trimble
and Griffen. Bednarski eventually ordered the two to undress. When both refused,
Bednarski pulled out a gun, shoved it in Trimble's mouth, and squeezed the trigger three
times. Meanwhile, Griffen tried to crawl away, but Bednarski stepped on him and fired,
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o On January 21, 1990, Michael Taylor and Phillip Sarlo brutally beat
and killed James Zappalorti in Staten Island, New York. Taylor later
exclaimed that he and Sarlo had killed "only a gay
'1" 62
The brutal and gruesome character of the Schindler, Wight/Brenner,
Bednarski, and Zappalorti cases indicates the intensity of the hatred felt
by elements of American society against homosexual men and women.
Certainly hate crimes against homosexual men and women are not the
only crimes involving gruesome brutality, but this feature characterizes
much anti-lesbian and -gay violence.
b. Secondary Victimization
Victims of anti-homosexual hate crimes are frequently reluctant to
report incidents or to fully prosecute incidents once they are reported1
63
because many lesbians and gay men fear that reporting and prosecution
may result in exposure of their sexual orientation. 164 Their fear is not
simply a matter of weathering rejection and stigmatization by family,
friends, and community groups.165 It also reflects a justifiable concern that
once exposed, the lesbian or gay victim can face termination of employ-
ment, eviction from housing, denial of public accommodations, and loss
of child custody.166 Lesbians and gay men, unlike most other minority
groups, are not protected by major federal and state civil rights statutes.
167
emptying the gun. The trial judge, who denied the prosecutor's request for a sentence of
life imprisonment, imposing instead a sentence of 30 years, stated, "I put prostitutes and
gays at about the same level, and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a
prostitute" Id.
162 See 1990 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 139, at 12; Thomas J. Maier, Because He
Was Gay?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 1990, at 8. After returning from the Vietnam War with
what appeared to be a slight mental impairment, Zappalorti acknowledged his homosexu-
ality and had begun dating other men, although he still lived with his parents in Staten
Island. To have a secluded and private space of his own and to escape the taunts of
"faggot" and "queer" by local youths, Zappalorti constructed a small hut in a clearing
separated from his family's neighborhood by wooded swampland. It was at this hut that
Zappalorti was cornered by Taylor and Sarlo, who repeatedly stabbed Zappalorti because
they were outraged by his homosexuality. Id.
163 See, e.g., Kevin T. Berrill & Gregory M. Herek, Primary and Secondary Victimi-
zation in Anti-Gay Hate Crimes: Official Response and Public Policy, in CONFRONTING
VIOLENCE, supra note 160, at 293 [hereinafter Berrill & Herek, Secondary Victimization].
164See, e.g., Michael Collins, The Gay-Bashers, in CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra
note 160, at 197 ("Many gay-bashing incidents are unreported or are reported to the gay
organizations and not the police, out of fear by the victims of disclosure of their
identities:').
165 Nevertheless, fear of consequences among family and friends can itself be a
powerful disincentive for reporting. See Joyce Hunter, Violence Against Lesbian and Gay
Male Youths, in CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 160, at 78.
166See Berrill & Herek, Secondary Victimization, supra note 163, at 289.
167 For example, TitleII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided that all persons shall
be entitled to "the full and equal enjoyment" of all public accommodations, free of
"discrimination or segregation" only on the ground of race, color, religion or national
HeinOnline -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413 1994
 l ,  
•  ,    t 
 r 
 l   ille  "only a gay."162 
t r  l  
i, i   
  t l  
     
   
 ti l i    i l . 
  i i ti  
 s ual  t  
  ll  r t  i ci e ts once they are reported 63 
    tion 
  
 ri    
  65    
    i   
  ations,  
  tody.166  
 t r t t   aj r federal and state civil rights statutes.167 
i  .   '    
 t,        
 t t t   l l,  '    t t  i   li   illi   
." l . 
162See 1990 LTF Ep T, supra te , t ;  . i ,  
 , . , . ft   
  t l l rti  -
t   
      
t"  ti    
t    .  
l rti     
  . l . 
163 See, e.g., evin . errill  re r  . r , i ry  
 t  s: lic ,   
,       ti ]. 
 ,  s ers, ,  
,   t  t    
ti s    
'). 
165 Nevertheless, fear of consequences  f il     
l    
l  ,  ,  
166See Berrill & erek, Secondary icti ization,  t  , . 
67 'll    
 titl  t      t     ti ns,  f 
is ri i tion r s r ti  l   t  r  f r , l r, r li i  r ti l 
414 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
Discrimination against homosexuals in most areas of the country is en-
tirely legal.
The consequences of exposure as a homosexual in many areas of the
country, even today, can be destructive. 168 Two scholars have termed the
punitive societal reaction to exposure of a lesbian or gay man resulting
from reporting a hate crime as "secondary victimization" '169 Secondary
victimization occurs not only when social units (such as the workplace,
the church, and the family) react punitively to the victim's homosexuality
but also when the criminal justice system itself responds to the report of
an anti-lesbian or -gay hate crime by mistreating the victim. 70 Indeed, a
not insignificant portion of reported anti-homosexual hate crime is perpe-
trated by police officers. 171 At the very least, police, prosecutors, and
judges may view violence against homosexuals as insignificant, or even
justified.'
72
These types of "secondary victimization" have two effects. First, they
constitute harassment, and sometimes violence, against lesbians and gay
men as incidents in themselves. Second, they effectively discourage the
reporting of hate crimes by lesbian and gay victims. The fear of secondary
victimization is acknowledged to be a major factor in the underreporting
of anti-homosexual hate crimes.
73
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988). No federal civil rights statute protects lesbians and gay
men as such.
Only eight states have comprehensive statewide statutes barring discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1102.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (bars
employment discrimination only); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81a to -8ir (West 1986
& Supp. 1993); HAwAii REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (bars employment
discrimination only); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. § 363.01
(1992), as amended by Act of April 2, 1993, 1993 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (West);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 961,
963 (1985 & Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4502, 4503 (1984 & Supp. 1992);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1987 & Supp. 1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22, 111.31
(West 1988 & Supp. 1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 230.18 (West 1987).




170Kevin T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An
Overview, in CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 160, at 31; Joseph Harry, Conceptual-
izing Anti-Gay Violence, in CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 160, at 121,
171 See, e.g., 1992 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 134, at 29 (describing seven incidents
in seven states during 1992 under the heading "Police Abuse"); 1991 NGLTF REPORT,
supra note 151, at 19-20 (describing seven incidents in six states during 1991 under the
same heading). See generally COMSTOCK, supra note 153, at 152-62.
172See, e.g., Berrill & Herek, Secondary Victimization, supra note 163, at 294; Linda
Garnets, Gregory M. Herek & Barrie Levy, Violence and Victimization of Lesbians and
Gay Men: Mental Health Consequences, in CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 160, at
220-21.
173See, e.g., Richard Berk, Elizabeth A. Boyd, & Karl M. Hamner, Thinking More
Clearly About Hate-Motivated Crimes, in CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 160, at
133.
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Documented cases of failure to vindicate the rights of lesbian and
gay victims are largely limited to failures to fully prosecute, since failures
to report usually result in no documentary record of the incident. Some
examples follow:
* Michael Taylor and Phillip Sarlo, the attackers of James Zappalorti,
had previously been involved in anti-gay violence. A victim of one of
their earlier gay-bashing incidents had declined to press assault charges,
concerned about revealing his homosexuality.
174
* The 1987 killing of Leslie Wan in Fort Lauderdale by a group of
young men occurred in circumstances normally warranting a charge of
murder, but the principal assailant was permitted to plead no contest.
Activists inferred that prosecutors had accepted the plea because Wan's
family did not want him to be identified as a gay man in the media.
175
c. Seeking Out Victims
Another characteristic of anti-lesbian and -gay hate crimes is the
frequency with which perpetrators actively seek out opportunities to com-
mit violent attacks.1 76 Perpetrators will often plan to travel some distance
to search out victims with whom they would otherwise not have come
174See Maier, supra note 162, at 8; Lucy Reyes, Zappalorti's Killers Will Spend
Decades Behind Bars, OUTWVEEX, Jan. 16, 1991, at 12. Both Taylor and Sarlo had been
convicted for a robbery in April 1986, of a gay man in the South Beach section of Staten
Island. After picking up the victim in an area where gay men often congregate, the two,
with two other accomplices, brutally beat the victim with a tire iron until they believed
him dead, removed the car keys from his body, shoved him into the trunk of his car, and
took off in the victim's car on a joy ride. Although the four discussed whether to burn the
car to render the victim unidentifiable, they simply abandoned the car on a curbside. The
victim was rescued by a passerby hours later and was hospitalized with multiple skull
fractures, a shattered nose and jaw, and a broken foot. Due to the victim's concern of
exposure, a plea bargain was arranged solely on robbery charges. Id.
Sarlo was sentenced to 20 months in jail, and Taylor spent little more than a year in
prison. Ultimately, Taylor and Sarlo pleaded guilty to Zappalorti's killing, and each
received a sentence of slightly less than the maximum time of 25-years-to-life imprison-
ment. Id.175 See Gay Basher Gets 10 Years, WASH. BLADE, Apr. 28, 1989, at 16; Cliff O'Neill,
Broward Gay Basher Sentenced to 10 Years in State Prison, WKLY. NEws, Mar. 22, 1989,
at 3. David Schwartz verbally harassed Wan and two of his friends as they were leaving
a Fort Lauderdale nightclub. Although Wan's companions were able to get inside their car,
Schwartz and his accomplices attacked Wan, who was of slight build and weighed 100
pounds, kicking and beating him. Schwartz ultimately slammed Wan's head against the
bumper of the car. Wan died two days later from massive brain hemorrhaging. Id.
Schwartz pled no contest, and one of his accomplices pled guilty to manslaughter.
(The third attacker turned state's evidence and was not prosecuted.) Schwartz was
sentenced in 1989 to 10 years' imprisonment with the possibility of parole. At the time,
Florida prisoners spent an average of only 40 to 50% of their sentences behind bars. Id.
at 27.
176Not all anti-homosexual violence involves this "seeking-out" behavior, but enough
of it does to have attracted the attention of researchers. See, e.g., Harry, supra note 170,
at 118.
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into contact. 77 This pattern is consistent with certain other modes of
hate-motivated behavior directed against other groups, but this behavior
can also be contrasted with some types of hate crimes directed against
social and ethnic minorities.
Racial hostility can sometimes take the form of retaliation for a
member or members of a minority group moving into a previously all-
white community.178 For example, the recent Howard Beach and Benson-
hurst slayings occurred when African-American youths found themselves
in predominantly white communities. 179 In contrast, anti-homosexual hate
crime perpetrators frequently leave their own communities to enter com-
munities with large homosexual populations to seek opportunities to beat
and assault gays as a "thrillingly brutal rite of passage."8 0
Gary Comstock, a researcher on anti-lesbian and -gay violence, pro-
vided a telling description of this behavior pattern in his 1991 book,
Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men.18' Comstock quotes Charles
McCabe, for many years a prominent columnist for The San Francisco
Chronicle, who himself described the violence he and his friends had
inflicted on gay men:
In retrospect [McCabe] confesses the "cruel and decidedly
inhuman" nature of the practice and provides a description of its
pattern. The boys worked as a gang of six or seven, targeting a
single individual. Their action was not defensive, but an offen-
sive seeking out of targets in an area isolated by its location and
the time of day and frequented only by gay men, "an area where
hundreds of homosexuals cruised nightly." Their attacks were
not spontaneous reactions to unexpected encounters; rather, they
had a plan whereby they would "break up into pairs or singles
though always keeping an eye on each other during the cruising"
so that when one made a contact "the rest... followed along."
They were sustained in their efforts by their conviction, based
on their "religious training ... and the whispered prejudices of
177See, e.g., COMSTOCK, supra note 153, at 219 n.29 (quoting a San Francisco Police
Department liaison with the gay and lesbian community, who said anti-homosexual
attackers "are most often out-of-town toughs who come to the city expressly to hunt
homosexuals, or city residents resentful of homosexuals sharing their neighborhoods and
public transportation").
178See, e.g., People v. Justice, No. 90-1793, slip op. at 4-5 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Washtenaw
County, Nov. 28, 1990) (defendant's statement at the scene of the arson evidenced hostility
to having African-Americans living in his neighborhood); see also William E. Schmidt,
Local Setback for Michigan Law on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al8.
179See, e.g., Howard Beach Retrial Starts, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1990, at A9; Three
Teenagers Arraigned in New York Attack on Blacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1986, at A3;
Youths Hunted in Brooklyn Killing Surrender, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1989, at A3.
1S0Maier, supra note 162, at 8. See generally Collins, supra note 164.
181 COMSTOCK, supra note 153.
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[their] time" that they "were waging... a kind of holy war...
[and] doing the world a favor." It was because the gay man "was
so universally despised that aggression against him was viewed
as a virtue." The boys feared no punitive consequences because
the "homosexual had no weapon against [them] except his own
guile or ability to buy [them] off.' They knew that the "homo-
sexual was totally vulnerable," that "all the cards were in [their]
hands," including the cooperation of the "friendly cop."
McCabe says they operated with a sense of freedom, permis-
sion, and support to do whatever they wished to gay men:
"Depending on the situation, we could either hoot and holler
derisively, or we could beat up the guy, or we could take his
watch and his money. In some cases we could, and did, do all
three:'
182
Although McCabe was describing incidents that took place in the
early 1930s, the same behavior patterns are evident in much anti-homo-
sexual violence today, particularly the predatory seeking out of victims.183
Many victims of anti-homosexual hate crimes suffer much more than the
hollers and petty theft referred to by McCabe, as the 1988 assault of Rod
Johnson 84 and similar incidents demonstrate.
18 5
d. Moral Justification
Sometimes hate crimes against homosexual men and women are
justified, even after the fact, in moral or quasi-religious terms.18 6 For
example, a noted passage from Leviticus provides: "[i]f a man lies with
a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination;
they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them:' 187 Although this
182 d. at 19-20 (all alterations in original).
'
83See JACK O'MALLY, COOK COUNTY [ILL.] STATE'S ATTORNEY, A PROSECUTOR'S
GUIDE TO HATE CRIME VIII-8 (1994).
184 See James Rupert, Beatings Said to Reflect Dark Side of Skinheads, WASH. POST,
Dec. 19, 1988, at El; Kara Swisher, Two Convicted of Assault on Gay Man, WASH. POST,
Nov. 18, 1989, at B1. Johnson's shoulder and arm were broken, and his skull was
fractured, in an attack in Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C. His attacker later said to
police that he was one of a group of "skinhead" youths who made forays into Rock Creek
Park and Georgetown looking for people, especially gay men, to beat up, this time with
baseball bats. The attacker noted that even if Johnson had died, "I don't think I would
have felt any remorse about it ... I have a hatred for gays." The attacker and one of his
accomplices were convicted of assault with intent to kill with a deadly weapon and armed
robbery. Id.
185 See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text.
186Such moral justification need not be explicitly religion-based; it can be based on
notions of what kind of behavior is innately gender-appropriate. See Harry, supra note
170, at 113, 116; see also COMSTOCK, supra note 153, at 224 n.67.
1
87 CoMSTOCK, supra note 153, at 121 (quoting Leviticus 20:13).
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biblical source may not be broadly used to advocate the physical punish-
ment of lesbians and gay men, the violent language creates the impression
that violence is a legitimate consequence of their sexual behavior.188 While
this moral or religious justification is not an exclusive aspect of anti-ho-
mosexual hate crime (for example, religious overtones can be present in
anti-Semitic incidents), it remains a significant definitional trait.8 9
e. Homosexual Panic
Another characteristic of anti-homosexual hate crime is the tendency
for perpetrators to maintain that the attack was in retaliation for a sexual
advance and that such an advance justified a violent counterattack. 90 Of
course, sometimes (although probably not as often as alleged), the attack
may indeed have followed a sexual proposition. This does not mean that
an extremely violent response is legally justified. Allegations of this type
are not unusual; the 1988 murder of George Pollo is one egregious exam-
ple,191 but many other cases exhibit this feature as well.
92
1881d. at 123.
"89For example, on November 15, 1989, the home of Brad Evans in Springfield,
Missouri was destroyed by arson. Southwest Missouri State University was that night
beginning a run of performances of the play The Normal Heart, which concerns gay men
living in New York City in the early 1980s at the start of the AIDS crisis. Certain local
groups and individuals had complained bitterly over SMSU's production of the play.
Evans, 22 years old at the time and an SMSU student, formed a group to support the
production of the play, and the destruction of his apartment appears to have been in
retaliation for his activities with the group. Upon learning of the fire, Jean Dixon, the
Missouri state representative for the area, said that the arson was "terrible" but called
Evans a "Satan worshipper" and suggested he had set the fire himself. She later withdrew
her statement about satanism, saying she was not aware of being interviewed. Rick
Harding, Springfield's Shame, ADVOCATE, Dec. 19, 1989, at 8, 9; Robert Keyes, [Fire
Damages] Play Backer's Home, SPRINGFIELD NEWS LEADER, Nov. 16, 1989, at Al.
190See Berrill & Herek, Secondary Victimization, supra note 163. The authors consider
this "homosexual panic" defense to be the most dramatic example of "blaming the victim."
Id. at 295.
191 See Susan Lumenello, North Shore Murder Trial Ends with Conviction of Danvers
Man, BAY WINDows, Dec. 21-27, 1989, at 15. On May 31, Polio (aged 51 years) picked
up Darrin Smiledge (aged 24) and Kenneth Tarantino (aged 22) while Smiledge and
Tarantino were hitchhiking near Gloucester, Massachusetts. Witnesses saw the three men
in a secluded area of Gloucester drinking beer together. Tarantino said he saw Polio put
his hand on Smiledge's inner thigh, at which point Smiledge called Polio a "fag, a queer"
and hit him in the face. Smiledge continued to beat Pollo as Tarantino watched. The two
then tied up Polio with a clothesline found in the car, placed him in the trunk of his car,
and drove to a deserted area of North Beverly, Massachusetts. Id.
Smiledge then removed Polio from the trunk, strangled him to death with a clothesline
while Tarantino watched, and dumped the body behind a theater in North Beverly. Upon
his arrest, Smiledge told a deputy sheriff, "I killed that queer. Faggots have no right to
live." Id.
192See Maier, supra note 162, at 8 (discussing how Zappalorti's attackers had sought
out their victim). Also, the Schindler case contains an example of this pattern, because
Terry Helvey at one point made the claim that he attacked Allen Schindler when Schindler
made a pass at him. See Sterngold, Killer of a Gay Sailor, supra note 157, at A10. Helvey
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f Summary
Each of these characteristics is typical of hate crime against lesbians
and gay men: gruesome and brutal execution of the crime, the threat of
secondary victimization resulting in reduced likelihood of reporting and
prosecution, "seeking out" behavior to intentionally locate and select the
victim(s), an implicit moral or social justification for the violence, and
defenses built on an alleged sexual advance. Although not all are present
in all cases, and although there may be cases where none are present, each
is a broad characteristic of the phenomenon.
B. Hate Crime Statutes and Homosexuals
State legislatures have enacted a multiplicity of statutes addressing
hate-motivated violence and criminal conduct. 193 In order to effectively
address constitutional issues raised by these statutes, one must keep in
mind the differences among the types of laws the states have adopted. 194
1. Hate Speech Statutes versus Hate Crime Statutes
State laws designed to address the hate crime phenomenon fall broadly
into two categories: hate speech statutes and hate crime statutes. 195 Recent
United States Supreme Court cases have indicated that hate speech stat-
utes rest on tenuous constitutional footing, whereas hate crime statutes,
properly so called, are on much firmer ground.
Hate speech statutes are designed to redress harm inflicted when a
person makes a statement or engages in expressive conduct that derides
or devalues the hearer because of the hearer's race, color, religion, sexual
orientation, or other analogous characteristic.' 96
later admitted this statement was a lie. Id. Perhaps tellingly, Helvey had only made the
initial statement about the sexual advance after it was suggested to him as a possibility
by a Navy investigator. Sterngold, Motive in Killing, supra note 157, at A16.
193 See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, HATE CRIME STATUTES: A
1991 STATUS REPORT 1 (1991); Jonathan D. Selbin, Bashers Beware: The Continuing
Constitutionality of Hate Crimes Statutes after R.A.V., 72 OR. L. REV. 157, 160-64 (1993);
Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of Penalty Enhance-
ment for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178, 180-85 (1993).
194 Some laws against hate-motivated violence and other bias-motivated behavior have
been enacted at county, city, or other local levels. For example, the law implicated in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), was a municipal ordinance of the City
of St. Paul, Minnesota. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
195See, e.g., Anthony S. Winer, The R.A.V. Case and the Distinction Between Hate
Speech Laws and Hate Crime Laws, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 971 (1992); Note, Hate
Is Not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes, 106
HARv. L. REV. 1314, 1317 (1993) [hereinafter Note, Hate Is Not Speech].196The types of harm addressed by hate speech statutes were described in a landmark
article. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets
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The most prominent example during the last few years of a hate
speech statute was the city ordinance that the Supreme Court invalidated
in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.197 In that case, a seventeen-year-old defendant
was prosecuted for allegedly burning a cross on the front lawn of a
neighboring African-American family.198 Rather than prosecute under ar-
son or trespass laws, local officials prosecuted the defendant under the
city's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,'99 which provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor.
200
The ordinance was a hate speech ordinance because it was directed at
speech or expressive conduct: the placement of "symbols or objects," the
writing of "graffiti," and the utterance or writing of "characterizations"
or "appellations." The ordinance did not require that an act of physical
violence take place in order for a violation to occur. The law could have
been breached by a simple act of graphic communication, such as the
placement on one's own property of a provocative poster.
20'
All nine justices voted to strike down the ordinance, but a five-justice
majority voted to do so on a rationale widely considered to break new
ground in free speech law.20 2 The majority held that laws prohibiting even
"unprotected" speech must be content-neutral in order to avoid presump-
tive invalidity under the First Amendment. 20 3 The St. Paul ordinance at
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982). The subject continues to draw
substantial interest. See Robin D. Barnes, Standing Guard for the P.C. Militia, or Fighting
Hatred and Indifference: Some Thoughts on Expressive Hate-Conduct and Political Correct-
ness, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 979; Symposium, Homophobic and Racist Speech, supra note 11.
197112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
1981d. at 2541.
199 Id. (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).2001d. (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
201 See Brief for Petitioner at 20, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)
(noting that under the ordinance a homeowner could be prosecuted for placing certain
types of anti- or pro-choice placards on her own property).202Justice White said that the majority "casts aside long-established First Amendment
doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an untried theory." 112 S. Ct. at 2551
(White, I., concurring). The majority opinion has been termed "bizarre" and a "broad-
gauged challenge" to traditional free-expression jurisprudence. Philip Weinberg, R.A.V.
and Mitchell: Making Hate Crime a Trivial Pursuit, 25 CONN. L. REv. 299, 299-300
(1993). Another authority considers the majority decision to be "an ambitious reconcep-
tualization and synthesis of First Amendment doctrine" Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124, 127 (1992).203See R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (previous opinions terming certain areas of speech
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issue was not considered content-neutral and could not survive the pre-
sumption of invalidity; the Court therefore struck it down. 20 4 Most states
have not enacted hate speech statutes such as the one in R.A.V Hate
speech regulations have been more common on college campuses, but two
federal district courts have invalidated provisions of campus speech codes
on free speech grounds.
205
Hate crime statutes, unlike hate speech statutes, are not by their terms
directed at expressive statements. Instead, they increase the penalties
applicable to those convicted of violent crimes20 6 when the crimes are
motivated by hatred of or hostility to a societal group of which the victim
is a member. After the Supreme Court handed down the R.A.V decision,
there was a question as to whether hate crime statutes could or should
survive R.A.V's invalidation of hate speech statutes.
The Supreme Court resolved this issue, at least to a substantial extent,
with its unanimous holding in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.207 Mitchell arose out
of the beating of a white boy by a group of young African-American men
who allegedly had chosen their victim because of his race.208 The Wiscon-
sin authorities conducted their prosecution under a statute that increased
the maximum penalty for a defendant who commits certain specified
crimes if the defendant "intentionally selects" his victim because of the
victim's "race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national ori-
gin or ancestry."
20 9
Before the Supreme Court, the defendant's attorneys argued that the
Wisconsin statute "punishes thought" because it "enhances penalties based
upon the defendant's motives when those motives represent a viewpoint
or belief' and therefore violated the First Amendment. 210 The Supreme
Court noted that judges traditionally have considered a wide variety of
factors in sentencing, 211 that a legislature is as entitled to consider such
factors in drafting a statute as a judge is in sentencing,212 and that includ-
ing motive as such a factor was no more objectionable in the case of a
"unprotected" meant only that such areas of speech can be regulated only "because of
their constitutionally proscribable content" and not other elements of their content); id. at
2549-50 (regulations of non-proscribable elements of content subject to strict scrutiny).2041d. at 2549-50.
205 See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991);
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
206Definitions of violence can be subjective, and some have questioned the existence
of a clear dividing line between speech and violence. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against
the Male Flood. Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, in PORNOGRAPHY: PRIVATE
RIGHT OR PUBLIC MENACE 56, 58-59 (R.M. Baird & S.E. Rosenbaum eds., 1991).
207113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
208d. at 2196-97.
2091d. at 2197 (citing WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-1990)).
21°Brief for Respondent at 6, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
211113 S. Ct. at 2199.
2 12 1d. at 2200.
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criminal statute than in the case of a civil anti-discrimination statute.213
The Court distinguished R.A.V because the ordinance in that case "was
explicitly directed at expression," while the Wisconsin statute was "aimed
at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment." 214
Hate crime statutes in most cases stand on firmer constitutional foot-
ing than hate speech statutes, but hate crime statutes are not completely
exempt from constitutional challenge. First, defendants remain free to
challenge hate crime statutes under the free speech guarantees of state
constitutions. Such constitutions may have different standards for protec-
tion of free speech.215 Second, the various state hate crime statutes are
drafted in distinct ways. Many statutes use language similar to that of the
Wisconsin statute upheld in Mitchell, which speaks of an "intentional
selection of the victim" because of the listed traits. Not all states use the
Mitchell formulation, however, and the language used in some state stat-
utes might occasion First Amendment concerns even at the federal level. 216
Finally, issues of equal protection arise in the context of which classes of
persons are covered by hate crime statutes. One such issue is addressed
in Part III.
2. Three Kinds of Hate Crime Statute
Hate crime statutes can be broken down into distinct subclasses.217
This Article adopts three broad categories for the classification of hate
crime statutes: sentence-enhancement statutes, "new crime" statutes, and





215For example, in State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992), a case challenging the
constitutionality of an Oregon hate crime statute, the Oregon Supreme Court was careful
to address each of the defendant's claims under both the Oregon and federal constitutions.2 16 One example was the principal Florida hate crime statute, which requires penalty
enhancement for any felony or misdemeanor, the commission of which "evidences
prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or
national origin of the victim." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085(1) (West 1992). The use of the
phrase "evidences prejudice" could be viewed as more directly implicating freedom of
thought than the "intentional selection" language in the Wisconsin statute. However, in a
recent opinion the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the more open-ended language to
have the same meaning as the "intentional selection" phrase in the Wisconsin statute. State
v. Stalder, 1994 W.L. 19548 (Fla., January 27, 1994), at 5.
217 See, e.g., Selbin, supra note 193, at 163-64 (listing three forms of "hate crimes
statutes": "penalty enhancement statutes," "ethnic intimidation" laws, and "harassment and
intimidation laws" based on status); David D. Munster, Comment, R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul: The Future of Hate Speech Regulation, 70 UNIv. OF DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 347,
361-64 (1993) (listing "two primary groups" of "ethnic intimidation laws": "penalty-en-
hancing statutes" and laws that create "an entirely separate crime").
[Vol. 29
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Sentence-enhancement statutes supplement previously enacted sec-
tions of the state criminal code and add an extra penalty if the referenced
crimes are committed with the prohibited prejudice.218 Such statutes con-
stitute a new section in the criminal code or serve as an additional factor
for consideration in sentencing. 2 9 They may be codified or enacted so as
to add a new heading to the state's list of crimes, but they define no
behavior to be criminal that was not criminal prior to enactment.
A "new crime" statute does not refer to previously enacted sections
of the criminal code or to crimes defined elsewhere; it defines all the
elements of the crime it is describing within its own terms.220 The effect
of such a statute, like the one passed in Oregon, may well be additive, since
it penalizes behavior that may be criminal under other statutes as well, but
the drafting technique employed is one of stating all of the elements of a
separate, or "new," crime. The distinction between these statutes and
sentence-enhancement statutes is significant because a "new crime" stat-
ute-if not carefully drafted-could sweep sufficiently broadly to raise
218The principal Florida hate crime statute is one example:
The penalty for any felony or misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in
this subsection if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences
prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation,
or national origin of the victim:
(a) A misdemeanor of the second degree shall be punishable as if it were a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
(b) A misdemeanor of the first degree shall be punishable as if it were a felony
of the third degree.
(c) A felony of the third degree shall be punishable as if it were a felony of
the second degree.
(d) A felony of the second degree shall be punishable as if it were a felony of
the first degree.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085(1) (West 1992).219The Florida statute, id., is an example of a new code section; California has a
distinct penalty-enhancement clause in its sentencing statute for hate-motivated behavior.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 1985).
22 0An example is subsection (1)(a) of the Oregon hate crime statute that applies to
actions by two or more persons:
Two or more persons acting together commit the crime of intimidation in the
first degree, if the persons: ...
(A) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another
because of their perception of that person's race, color, religion, national origin
or sexual orientation; or
(B) With criminal negligence cause physical injury to another by means of a
deadly weapon because of their perception of that person's race, color, religion,
national origin or sexual orientation.
OR. REv. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a) (1989).
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the type of First Amendment concerns so detrimental in R.A V. For ex-
ample, if the word "physical" in subclause (A) of the Oregon statute were
followed by the phrase "or emotional" or if the word "physical" were
simply deleted, a defendant prosecuted under subclause (A) might argue
that it is impermissibly directed at expression.
22'
A civil rights model hate crime statute does not enhance penalties for
previously defined crimes and does not define specific criminal behavior
as a "new crime." Instead, it broadly criminalizes any violent deprivation
of a victim's civil rights, usually broadly characterized as those rights
guaranteed under the state or federal constitutions or laws. 222 Civil rights
model statutes are in a separate category because in some cases these
statutes do not refer to the categories of persons they protect.223 Their
protection extends potentially to the legal rights of all persons, without
reference to which particular kind of societal prejudice motivates the
perpetrator.
3. Coverage of Homosexuals
Thirty-four states currently have one or more hate crime statutes,
which are either in the form of sentence-enhancement statutes, 224 "new
221 Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548 (1992) ("What makes the
anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by violation of [a hate speech statute] distinct
from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is nothing
other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message.
The First Amendment cannot be evaded that easily.").
22 2An example is California's "Interference with Exercise of Civil Rights" statute:
No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat
of force, willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with, oppress, or threaten any
other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or
laws of the United States because of the other person's race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
223See infra notes 232 & 233 and accompanying text.
22ACAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.7, 422.75, 1170.75 (West 1985, 1988 & Supp. 1993);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4003 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para.
5/5-5-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1993); IowA CODE ANN. § 716.6A (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.595. Subds. la, 2(b) (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-222 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:33-4, 2C:44-3, 2C:43-7 (West Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-3 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1993); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2710 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-5-13 (Supp. 1992); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.47 (West Supp. 1994); TEx. ANN. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 42.014 (West Supp.
1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West Supp.
1992).
[Vol. 29
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crime" statutes, 225 or civil rights model statutes.226 Several states have
more than one hate crime statute, so that the total number of hate crime
statutes is forty-eight. These statutes vary in their substance beyond these
three basic divisions. Indeed, within one of these divisions, there are
numerous variations. Variation among the statutes is reflected in their
different names; "Ethnic Intimidation '227 is the most frequent caption
heading, although titles such as "Malicious Harassment '228 and "Mali-
cious Intimidation 229 are also used3 °0













225 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181b
(West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/12-7.1
(West Supp. 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A (1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 39 (West 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.147b (West 1991); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 574.090-.093 (Vernon Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West Supp.
1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14 (1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 166.155, .165
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-42-3 (Supp. 1992); S.D. COD. LAWS ANN. § 22-19B-1
(Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
226 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.5
(West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 37 (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2931-2932 (West Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-14-04,
-05 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3
(Michie Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
227 COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-121 (Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b
(West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 574.090-.093 (Vernon 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-401.14 (Michie Supp. 1992); OHIo RaV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1993); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2710 (West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (Supp. 1992).
228
IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 1993).229 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West
1993).
230There is no necessary connection between the various names and the subdivisions
of hate crime statutes described in the text. For example, some "Ethnic Intimidation"
statutes are sentence-enhancement statutes, and some are "new crime" statutes.
2311n addition, each of the following categories is listed in at least one hate crime
statute, as follows: Nationality (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.75, 1170.75 (West 1993); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3, 14-401.14 (Michie Supp. 1992)); Marital Status (D.C. CODE
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One way in which the statutes vary is in the classes of victims they
protect. Almost all the statutes contain a catalog of characteristics that, if
the basis of the bias-motivated attack, trigger heightened punishment for
the perpetrator. Of the forty-eight state hate crime statutes currently in
force, Table 4 shows the protected characteristics and the corresponding
number of statutes in which they appear.
Seven hate crime statutes do not explicitly list protected categories.
23 2
Such statutes are generally civil-rights model statutes that simply penal-
ize, for example, the violent deprivation of any right guaranteed by the
state or federal laws or constitutions.
233
Only fifteen states (including the District of Columbia) have hate
crime statutes that explicitly protect homosexual men and women.
234 Of
the forty-one statutes that contain catalogs of protected traits, eighteen
exclude sexual orientation,235 and the seven state statutes that do not
ANN. § 22-4001(1) (1992)); Personal Appearance (id.); Family Responsibility (id.);
Matriculation (id.); Involvement in Human or Civil Rights Activities (MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-5-221, 45-5-222 (1991)); Service in the United States Armed Forces (VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Equity Supp. 1992)).
232 IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.5 (West 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2931-2932
(West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 37 (West 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-14-05 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (1991); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.47 (West Supp. 1994); TEx. ANN. CODE CRmt. PROC. Art. 42.014 (West Supp. 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (Michie Supp. 1992). The Tennessee statutory language
setting forth its substantive hate crime provisions is preceded by precatory language listing
characteristics (race, color, ancestry, religion, and national origin) that were under consid-
eration of the legislature in enacting the statute. These characteristics are not, however,
included in the operative language of the hate crime provisions itself, nor do they form
part of the elements of the crime defined.
233See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2931-2932 (West Supp. 1992) ("No
person may, by force or threat of force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with,
or intentionally attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or
threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege,
secured to him by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States
Constitution or laws of the United States").
234 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, 1170.75 (West 1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-181b (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4003 (Supp. 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (Smith-Hurd
1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 729A.2 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.595. Subds. la, 2(b), 609.2231(4) (West
Supp. 1993 & West Supp. 1994); NE. Rmv. STAT. § 207.185 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:6 (Equity Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:12-I, :33-4, :44-3, :43-7 (West
1993); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 166.155, .165 (1989); R.I. GEN. LA~WS § 11-5-13 (Supp. 1992);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Equity Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080
(West Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West Supp. 1992).
235 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A (1992); MASS. GEN; LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 1990);
MIcH. Coap. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 574.090-.093
(Vernon 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-221, -222 (1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30
(McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-3, 14-401.14 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.1-14-04, -05 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2710 (West
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contain such catalogs presumably leave the question of whether lesbians
and gay men are covered to statutory interpretation.
A civil rights model statute, penalizing violent interference with the
exercise of another's rights under federal or state laws or constitutional
provisions, could be interpreted to preclude protection of homosexuals,
depending on the statutory environment of the state involved. If, for
example, the anti-discrimination laws of the particular state do not pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,236 and if the rele-
vant state statutes do not establish rights on the part of victims to be free
from societal aggression, 237 this kind of statute could be interpreted, as a
linguistic matter, to exclude homosexual men and women.
Many states have enacted hate crime statutes that explicitly exclude
lesbians and gay men. Sometimes this exclusion is plainly intentional;
238
other times, it is less clear.
III. Hate Crimes, Homosexual Exclusion, and Equal Protection
A hate crime statute that excludes lesbians and gay men from its
protection discriminates against them by impairing their fundamental right
to the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security. Such discrimi-
nation is unlikely to survive strict scrutiny; such a statute therefore vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause. Hate crime statutes should be construed
to include protection of homosexual men and women, where possible, to
save their constitutionality. When such a construction is not possible, they
should be struck down.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (Supp. 1992); S.D. COD. LAWS ANN. § 22-19B-1
(Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
236The eight states that do provide protection against discrimination to lesbians and
gay men were cited supra note 167, as were the federal provisions illustrating a lack of
federal protection in this area. Indeed, the Hate Crime Statistics Act was the first federal
law ever to include a "sexual orientation" provision. See 1990 NGLTF REPORT, supra note
139, at 3.237 The fact that state criminal law may prohibit assault, for example, would not
necessarily imply a right to be free from assault, at least in constitutional terms. Cf
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (state
has no constitutional duty to protect against private violence, although presumably the
assault and battery involved were contrary to state law).
238For example, a critical group of New York state legislators has been able to block
hate crime legislation in that state, specifically because the legislation as drafted would
protect homosexuals. See, e.g., John D. Hartigan, Don't Categorize Sodomy as Innocuous,
GANNETT WESTCHESTER NEWSPAPERS, Sept. 3, 1990, at Al; Michael A. Riff, Combat All
Crimes Prompted by Bigotry, GANNETT WESTCHESTER NEWSPAPERS, Sept. 3, 1990, at Al.
It has also been asserted that the blockage of the legislation is due to other factors. See
Where Republicans Stand on Hate Crime Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at E7.
In Missouri, state legislators deleted coverage of sexual orientation in a hate crime
statistics bill that had been initially drafted to include such coverage. See Senate Commit-
tee Deletes Gays from Hate Crimes Bill, LESBIAN GAY NEws-TLEGRAPH, Mar. 1991, at
1.
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A. Excluding Homosexuals from Protection Impairs a Fundamental
Right
Constitutional doctrine and historical analysis strongly suggest the
existence of the fundamental right to the equal benefit of laws protecting
personal security. Excluding lesbians and gay men from a hate crime
statute is invidious discrimination. Such discrimination is tantamount to
denying them a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause.
1. Excluding Homosexuals Is Invidious Discrimination via the
Criminal Law
Differential application of criminal justice and differential coverage
of the criminal law were prominent among the injustices the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses designed the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment to redress.239 Situations in which the violators of freed Afri-
can-Americans were punished less severely than assailants of whites, or
were not punished at all, were of great concern to the Reconstruction
Congresses. 240 Such occurrences were among the reasons that the 1866
Act included the right to "the equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property. 241 The right to the equal benefit
of laws protecting personal security must be considered a fundamental
right under the Amendment.
A hate crime statute that denies coverage to homosexuals works an
injustice very similar to that worked during Reconstruction by the differ-
ential enforcement of criminal laws that were supposed to protect Afri-
can-Americans. During Reconstruction, the assailant of a white would
generally receive the punishment prescribed by law, while the assailant of
a newly freed African-American might receive a lesser or no punishment.
Under a modern hate crime statute that does not include homosexuals, the
perpetrator of a hate crime against a Jew or an Arab 242 will receive the
punishment prescribed by the statute, while the perpetrator of a hate crime
against a homosexual will receive no punishment.
239See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 70, at 171.
24°See id. at 94 (quoting S. REP. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866)).
241 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
242Note that virtually all hate crime statutes that specify protected characteristics
cover victims with respect to that characteristic, regardless of the group to which they
belong. In other words, the statutes protect against attacks because of the "race" br
"religion" of the victim, rather than protecting against attacks because the victim is
"African-American" or "Jewish:' As a result, a crime can be a hate crime in these
jurisdictions whether the victim is white or African-American, Arab or Jew. For this
reason, the specification of protected characteristics in the statute does not itself work a
differential enforcement of the criminal law and does not itself violate equal protection,
[Vol. 29
HeinOnline -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 428 1994
  il ti s   
  ls tion irs ental 
 
l   i    
 l  t   
l i     
.    
 l  ti   
i   i s i ination  
i inal  
ti l ti    ti l e 
l t  
s t   t  
t t  .239      
i s     ,  
 t i   ,    i  
.   ces   
   it    
   erty."241  it 
  r  t l 
 
 t  ri  t t t  t t i   t  ls   
   ti  
ent l   t 
i s.  i ,  l  
   i    f 
rican   
   
t t    t  i  i t     242   
  t r   
   
239 See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 70, at 171. 
240S  .    . . , 66». 
241 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866). 
242 Note that virtually all hate crime statutes that specify protected characteristics 
 t ri tic, l    
l . I  t r r , t  t t t  r t t i t tt    t    
li i   t  i ti , t  t  t ti      
fri - ri "  i ."   lt,  i    
j ri i ti  t r t  i ti  i  it   i - erican,   .   
r s , t  ifi ti  f r t t  r t ri ti  i  t  t t t   t it l    
iff r ti l f r t f t  ri i l l    t it lf i l t  l t ti . 
1994] Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution 429
Of course, the attacker of the homosexual may nevertheless receive
the general punishment for, say, assault, but this merely means that he
receives a lesser punishment than the perpetrator of the same offense
against the Jew or the Arab, in the same way a Reconstruction assailant
of an African-American might have received some punishment, but less
than he would have received had he assaulted a white. The Reconstruction
Congresses surely did not think it just to allow unequal punishment of
the two assailants just because the assailant of the African-American may
have received some punishment.
It is also true that the 1866 Act by its terms only addressed inequali-
ties suffered by African-Americans; the "equal benefit" of laws for the
security of the person was stated to be equal to that "enjoyed by white
citizens. ' 243 It could thus be inferred that it is inappropriate to use the
1866 Act to advance the rights of other groups.
Such an inference, however, is unjustified. This Article uses the 1866
Act only as an indication of which rights the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment considered "fundamental." The Act is useful only insofar as
it discerns the fundamental character of the rights it protects, quite apart
from the particular classes to which the Act referred upon its adoption.
Indeed, the modem Fourteenth Amendment provides substantial protec-
tion against discrimination on the basis of sex,244 ethnic ancestry,245 and
other categories 246 that have nothing to do with race, notwithstanding the
language in the 1866 Act. Furthermore, the other fundamental rights listed
in the 1866 Act (such as the right to contract and hold property) are no
less fundamental when enjoyed by groups other than African-Americans.
2. Equality of Application, Not Assertion of Absolute Right
The recognition of the right to equal benefit of laws protecting per-
sonal security arises out of an asymmetry in the treatment of gay men
and lesbians. The asserted right is that gay men and lesbians receive equal
treatment under hate crime laws, not that a particular level of protection
is owed to them in the first instance. As such, the argument presented here
is stated under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process
Clause.
243 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. at 27.
244See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
classifications by gender under the Equal Protection Clause).
245See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny
to classifications based on national origin under the Equal Protection Clause).
246 Governmental discrimination on the basis of status as an alien is generally thought
to be impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause unless the discrimination satisfies
a form of heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.12(a),
at 702.
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Cases such as DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,247 determining that the state has "'no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services for those within its border,"'2 48 are inapposite. In that
case, the petitioner was a minor child who was beaten and permanently
injured by his father.249 For a period of several months preceding the
beating, Wisconsin social workers received numerous indications that the
father was continually abusing his child but did nothing to remove the
child from the home or to address the father's behavior.
250
The child and his mother sued the social services department, claim-
ing that the department had violated the child's Fourteenth Amendment
right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. 251 The Court
disagreed, stating that "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause
itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. '252 The Court stated that the
purpose of the Due Process Clause "was to protect the people from the
State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other."253 The
Court concluded that "a State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause" 2
54
DeShaney is not inconsistent with the argument advanced here. This
Article does not argue that lesbians and gay men must receive a certain
degree of protection as an initial matter; rather, it argues that if other
minorities that regularly suffer hate violence are protected, lesbians and
gay men should receive the same degree of protection offered to them.
The DeShaney result rests on the Due Process Clause, whereas the asser-
tion here put forward is based on the Equal Protection Clause.255
No argument is presented here that a state is required to enact a hate
crime statute at all. This Article does not even suggest that hate crime
statutes are a good idea, from a policy perspective.256 A state is free to
247489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2481d. at 196 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)).
249Id. at 191.




3 d. at 196.
254 d, at 197.
25 The reasoning of DeShaney itself does not suggest that an equal protection
challenge on similar facts would necessarily fail. Suppose that the social welfare authori-
ties in DeShaney had routinely shown greater care and solicitude for non-retarded children
and had only demonstrated the lack of attention shown there toward retarded children,
Surely the DeShaney ruling would not preclude an equal protection argument on behalf of
the retarded children. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(invalidating under the Equal Protection Clause a zoning ordinance prohibiting the
operation of a group home for the mentally retarded).
256 Other commentators addressing the constitutionality of hate crime statutes have not
been so timid. See, e.g., Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can
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punish hate crime assaults at any level, or conceivably not at all. However,
once a state draws arbitrary lines by punishing assaults against some
people but not others similarly situated, it deprives the unprotected of
their right to the equal benefit of laws for personal security.
Bowers v. Hardwick 57 is not inconsistent with the argument advanced
here. Hardwick involved a facial challenge to a Georgia sodomy statute
by Michael Hardwick, who was charged with violating the statute by
engaging in sexual relations with another man in the privacy of his own
bedroom. 258 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
statute violated Hardwick's fundamental right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.259 The Supreme Court re-
versed, declaring that there was no "fundamental right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy."260 The Hardwick decision is often viewed as a sub-
stantial obstacle to the assertion of constitutional rights by homosexuals
as a class.
261
The Hardwick Court addressed whether Georgia's sodomy statute
was consistent with fundamental rights of privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court specifically noted that Hard-
wick did not argue his case on equal protection grounds262 and implied
that its opinion did not address possible relief under that clause.
263
Quite apart from the difference between the two clauses, the funda-
mental right asserted in Hardwick-a right to privacy covering homosex-
ual conduct-is not at all the same right as the one asserted here. This
Article advances an entirely different fundamental right of equal protec-
tion: the right to the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security.
The indicia of this right's legitimacy are substantial and completely un-
affected by Hardwick, even when the right is asserted by homosexual men
or women.
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 333, 381-93 (1991) (arguing against sentence-enhancing hate
crime statutes as a policy matter as well as on constitutional grounds); Note, Hate Is Not
Speech, supra note 195, at 1341 ("Statutes that enhance penalties for crimes committed
because of the victim's race or similar characteristic are not only constitutional; they are
necessary.").
57478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2l5 d. at 187-88.
2591d. at 189.2601d. at 191.
261 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989); Padula
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).262Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8.
263 At least one prominent commentator has noted the reliance of the Hardivick opinion
on the Due Process Clause and asserted that homosexual men and women should still be
able to obtain protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual
Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and
Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1161 (1988).
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3. Scope of the Right
One important question remains: if the Constitution requires that
homosexuals not be excluded from hate crime statutes, what is to prevent
others such as dog-lovers or cat-lovers, Democrats or Republicans from
claiming the same right? In other words, if one concedes the constitu-
tional argument presented here, does not one embark on a "slippery slope"
that has no rational ending point?
Justice Scalia is sensitive to this type of "slippery slope" argument.
During oral argument in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,264 he suggested the possi-
bility of a state including hate-crime protection for any victim who is
attacked because he "believes in the hole in the ozone layer" or because
'he "believes that the earth revolves around the sun rather than vice-
versa.' 265 Justice Scalia was addressing the issue of whether a state could
constitutionally include such protection, not whether a victim could claim
that a state is constitutionally required to include such protection. While
in some sense sarcastic, the examples he used can be employed in que-
rying the scope of the Equal Protection argument made here.
What is called for in this context is a bit of realism. This Article has
demonstrated the widespread, persistent, and significant incidence of hate
crimes against gay men and lesbians. 266 They are widespread in the sense
that they occur and are reported in every geographical region of the
country. They are persistent in the sense that they have occurred and been
reported now for close to ten consecutive years by national and regional
lesbian and gay civil rights groups across the country.267 Anecdotal evi-
dence describes the occurrence of such crimes as early as two generations
prior to the beginning of organized record-keeping and suggests that hate
crimes occurred before that as well. 268 They are significant in that they
can involve very serious crimes, including murder, and appear to occur in
quantities broadly analogous to the incidence of hate crimes committed
against other groups universally protected in hate crime statutes. 269 Com-
mon threads run through the commission of much anti-homosexual hate
crimes.
Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men are also significant because
some agents of the justice system may consider them "insignificant,"
264113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
265 Official Transcript: Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at
10, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515) (Alderson Reporting Co.).
266See supra part II.A.l.b.
267The NGLTF, for example, has been keeping records on anti-lesbian and anti-gay
violence since 1985. See 1990 NGLTF REPORT, supra note 139, at 1.268See supra notes 181 & 182 and accompanying text.
269Comparisons were earlier made, for example, concerning data for relevant periods
compiled by the NGLTF and the ADL. See supra notes 98, 129-137, & 152 and
accompanying text.
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believing that such crimes primarily consist of fabricated incidents pro-
duced by the hysterical imaginations of homosexuals. Although some
reported hate crimes may be exaggerated, a danger of exaggeration is no
doubt present in all reported crime data, whether or not they have to do
with hate crimes or homosexuals. Although the reporters of anti-gay and
-lesbian hate crime statistics acknowledge the limitations of their data,
270
no serious observer has for that reason challenged statements that such
hate crimes are widespread, significant, and persistent. Such statements
could not be made about hate crimes against people who "don't believe
in the hole in the ozone layer" or who "don't believe the earth revolves
around the sun." Such statements could not even be made about attacks
against Republicans or Democrats.
The fact is that the same "slippery slope" arguments about the ozone
or earth-orbit believers, Democrats or Republicans, could have been made
with respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.271 The 1964 Act initiated the
modem era of civil rights protection in this century and is the source of
the modem Title VII.272 Could one not have argued in 1964 that the Act was
inadvisable because if we protect African-Americans and Jews against
discrimination, the next thing you know ozone and earth-orbit believers,
Democrats and Republicans, will claim the same protection?
Such an argument would not have been persuasive after a realistic
and unbiased assessment of social conditions. Such an assessment would
have required the conclusion that some groups in society have suffered a
long history of discrimination, are at greater risk of discrimination, and
stand to suffer more dire consequences from discrimination than others.
It was imperative to protect these disadvantaged groups from such conse-
quences. In this light, any "slippery slope" argument about ozone and
earth-orbit believers, in the context of the 1960s civil rights movement,
should have been seen as a diversion divorced from reality.
"Smoke screen" arguments such as those suggested by Justice
Scalia's Mitchell questioning should be resisted. The victimization of
homosexual men and women by hate crimes is no less a social reality
than the victimization of other minorities by hate crimes or the general
societal discrimination experienced by many. Discrimination against les-
bians and gay men by excluding them from hate crime protection is
particularly serious, however, because it discriminates in allowing access
to a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause.
The discrimination outlawed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act was also
on a different footing than the right asserted here. Arguably, there is no
27°See supra part II.A.2.b.27 1Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2 72 Id. at 253. See generally CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE
(1985).
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fundamental right to a particular job or to be served at a particular hotel
or restaurant. The discrimination in those cases is invidious, but that may
be solely because of the classifications used, not the fundamental charac-
ter of any rights there involved. With hate crime statutes, however, a
fundamental right is squarely implicated, rooted firmly in the policy and
history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. Once the government undertakes to protect one
class of persons from the same act of criminal violence more than another,
it approaches a very serious threshold of legitimacy. If it does so by
denying homosexuals hate crime protection while granting it to others, it
has crossed the threshold into presumptive illegitimacy.
Other groups may make the same constitutional argument for them-
selves that is advanced here for lesbians and gay men. If any such group
could show that hate crimes against its members across the country were
widespread, persistent and significant, that a social history of hate crime
against its members existed, that such incidents were tabulated and re-
corded, and that such incidents produced identifiable and distinct patterns
of criminal behavior in perpetrators, 273 then the social reality of their
victimization would be established. Excluding such a group from hate
crime protection while granting hate crime protection to others would
indeed occasion strict review under the Equal Protection Clause. This
review results from the very critical and very fundamental nature in our
history of the right to the equal protection of a particular kind of law; the
kind of law that provides for the security of the person and safety from
violence.
4. Clear and Facial Discrimination
A hate crime statute that excludes homosexuals does so by its terms.
The discrimination occurs either explicitly through a listing of traits not
including sexual orientation or indirectly through judicial interpretation
of a civil rights model statute. In either situation, discrimination has
certainly occurred. The text of the statute, as written or interpreted, pro-
tects one class of persons and not another.
The effectiveness of a given statute in preventing hate crimes-even
against gay men and lesbians-is irrelevant to assessing the facial dis-
crimination worked by the statute. It is accordingly irrelevant what the
actual experience of a particular statute may be in any particular case. It
has been argued that hate crime statutes are unlikely to produce the effects
for which they are designed,274 and the extent to which they in fact
273All of these characteristics are true with respect to anti-homosexual violence, as
discussed supra.274See Symposium, Penalty Enhancement, supra note 7, at 388-93.
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function as deterrents is uncertain. 75 This is unimportant. What counts is
the facial applicability of the statute to one group and not another.
276
5. Intentional Legislative Discrimination
Legislatures often intend to discriminate against lesbians and gay
men when enacting limited hate crime statutes. For example, in the New
York state legislature, a new hate crime statute has been repeatedly de-
feated by state legislators who have declared their desire, among other
things, to avoid the protection of lesbians and gay men. 277 Similar events
have been reported in the Missouri legislature, where a hate crime report-
ing statute was killed because its proponents insisted that sexual orienta-
tion be included in the bill's terms for hate crime reporting.2 78 In both
states, previously enacted hate crime laws protect several other classes of
victims from hate crimes but exclude lesbians and gay men.279
Intentional discrimination by the legislature is particularly pernicious,
but even when a legislature excludes homosexuals incidentally or inadver-
tently, the discrimination is no less clear and direct. The equal protection
2751t is of course broadly acknowledged that deterrence is one of the traditional
justifications for punishment. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL
LAW § 1.5, at 24-25 (2d ed. 1986); Ernest van den Haag, Legal Punishment, 26 AM. CRtM.
L. REv. 1789, 1795, 1799-1801 (1989). If one were to criticize hate crime statutes in
particular because deterrence in general does not work, one would need to address much
more of the criminal law than merely hate crime statutes, as the deterrence rationale
underlies much of criminal justice theory. On the other hand, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines make significant use of the device of sentence enhancements, presumably at
least in part because of their deterrent value. See, e.g., Michael Schechter, Sentencing
Enhancements Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Punishment Without Proof, 19
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 653 (1992).
276This argument is not advanced just in the context of hate crimes. For example, in
the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court
decided a series of cases invalidating segregated facilities in a variety of contexts: public
beaches and bathhouses, municipal golf courses, buses, parks, athletic contests, airport
restaurants, courtroom seating and municipal auditoriums. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 13, § 14.8(d)(2) at 626. It would not have mattered for equal protection purposes the
extent to which such laws were actually enforced or the extent to which they actually
resulted in racial segregation. The fact that the laws provided for unequal treatment on
their face was enough to work the societal harm for purposes of Brown and its progeny.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), reinforces this point in a slightly different
way. In Skinner, a state criminal statute by its terms provided for the sterilization of
habitual violators of certain criminal laws but not others. The Supreme Court noted that
the sterilization scheme impaired the fundamental right to procreation. Arguably, this
would have been no less the case if in actual practice the sterilization procedure were only
used on persons who for whatever reason (age, poor health, infertility) were much less
apt to procreate anyway. What matters is not the extent to which the fundamental right
may be actually impaired from case to case, but rather the official discrimination stated
by the statute on its face.277See Hartigan, supra note 238, at Al. But see Where Republicans Stand on Hate
Crime Legislation, supra note 238, at E7.275 See Senate Committee Deletes Gays From Hate Crimes Bill, supra note 238, at 1.
279 See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 574.090-.093 (Vernon 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30
(McKinney 1993).
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doctrine developed in cases like Washington v. Davis,2= requiring inquiry
into legislative motive, is also applicable when the discrimination is not
stated in the statute but works through disparate impact. The exclusion of
homosexuals from the hate crime statutes at issue here is not the result of
disparate impact; it is stated in the statutes themselves.
B. The Exclusion of Homosexuals and Strict Scrutiny
A hate crime statute that excludes lesbians and gay men from its
coverage invidiously discriminates against them and impairs their funda-
mental right to the equal benefit of laws protecting personal security. It
does not follow automatically from this, however, that such laws violate
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Even invidious discrimi-
nation that impairs a fundamental right may still be upheld if it survives
strict scrutiny review.
21
To survive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute
must satisfy two criteria: (a) it must promote a "compelling state inter-
est;' and (b) it must be "narrowly tailored" to promote that interest. 2 2 It
is unlikely that a hate crime statute that excludes homosexuals would
satisfy either of these criteria.
After Bowers v. Hardwick,28 3 it is clear that discouragement of homo-
sexual sexual conduct is a legitimate state interest. The Supreme Court
held that states could criminalize "homosexual sodomy" and that such
state action has a rational basis. 284 The most credible purpose that a state
would have for excluding homosexuals from hate crime statutes would be
this desire to discourage homosexual behavior.285
280 4 26 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, the Supreme Court analyzed an employment
examination used in hiring decisions for a municipal police force. Although the examina-
tion on its face was race-neutral, many more white applicants passed than African-Ameri-
can applicants. Id. at 237, 245. In upholding the use of the examination, the Court
determined that state action having disparate impact against minorities did not require
close scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause unless the legislature acted with a
discriminatory purpose. Id. at 246-48.
281 See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.3, at 575; TRIBE, supra note
13, § 16-6, at 1451, § 16-7, at 1454.282See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.3, at 575.
283478 U.S. 186 (1986). See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
284478 U.S. at 196.
285 Other theoretical bases are possible as rationales for excluding such protection for
homosexuals, but most attempts to succinctly state them demonstrate their insubstantiality.
For example, one could characterize the state interest as "discouraging people from
looking like homosexuals in public" but this is unlikely to amount to even a legitimate
state purpose for equal protection purposes. One could argue that the state purpose is
simply to state a moral disapproval of homosexuality. However, this purpose is no more
likely to pass strict scrutiny, when applied to hate crime statutes that exclude lesbians and
gays, than the purpose posited in the text.
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28°426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, the Supreme Court analyzed an employment 
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281 See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.3, at 575; I , sll r  t  
13, § 16-6, at 1451,  - , t . 
282See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13,  . , t . 
283 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text. 
284 478 U.S. at 196. 
285 Other theoretical bases are possible as rationales for excluding such protection for 
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Although it is clear after Hardwick that discouraging homosexual
behavior is a legitimate state purpose, it is equally clear that this is not a
compelling state interest. State sodomy statutes are virtually never en-
forced against adult gay men and lesbians engaging in private, consensual,
noncommercial sexual relations. 2 6 These kinds of homosexual relations
are now and for some time have been quite widespread. If the deterrence
of these acts were indeed a compelling state interest, they would be
prosecuted at least occasionally. Accordingly, the states have demon-
strated by their own behavior that they have no compelling interest in
discouraging homosexual sexual conduct. The use of hate crime statutes
to discourage such conduct thus fails the first prong of strict scrutiny
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.
Furthermore, no hate crime statute that excludes homosexuals could
be considered "narrowly drawn" to advance the state interest of discour-
aging homosexual sexual conduct. Clearly, no rational relationship exists
between more readily allowing criminals to attack homosexuals and dis-
couraging homosexuals from engaging in sexual behavior. One lesbian or
gay man might be brutally attacked who had not had homosexual sex for
twelve to eighteen months, while another lesbian or gay man might escape
hate crimes altogether while having frequent homosexual relations. Fur-
thermore, the link between one's sexual behavior and the protection from
personal attack one receives from the criminal law is extremely attenu-
ated.
IV. Conclusion
Even by the most restrictive interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the discriminatory impair-
ment of the fundamental right to the equal benefit of laws protecting
personal security. Lesbians and gay men are subject to persistent, sig-
nificant and widespread hate-motivated violence in our country. Yet many
state hate crime statutes explicitly exclude them from the added protection
such statutes provide to others. This exclusion impairs the fundamental
right of lesbians and gay men to the equal benefit of laws protecting
personal security and is not sufficiently supported by adequate state poli-
cies to withstand close scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Those statutes that explicitly exclude homosexuals, and those that are
interpreted to exclude them, on their face violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Statutes that do not contain explicit lists of protected traits must
286 See, e.g., Hardivick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) ("It was conceded
at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against respondent Hardwick, there had been
no reported decision involving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under this
statute for several decades").
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be interpreted to protect gay men and lesbians in order to survive consti-
tutional examination. Statutes that do contain explicit lists of protected
classes must be amended or interpreted to include protection for lesbians
and gay men. Statutes that are not so amended or interpreted should be
invalidated. Although invalidation may seem a harsh result for statutes
designed to protect minorities, the protection they offer embodies dis-
crimination that impairs the fundamental rights of those who are ex-
cluded. Such interpretation or amendment of hate crime statutes is in the
best interests of potential victims and would be most responsive to the
commands of the Constitution.
HeinOnline -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 438 1994
   i  [  
 i t r r t  t  t t   l i  t  
tutional exa ination. tat tes t t  t i  li it li t    
l ss s st    i t t  t  i l  
a   . t t t s t t r  t s   s  
invalidated. lthough i ali ati     r  lt  t t  
designed t  r tect i riti s, t  r t ti  t  
cri ination t at i airs t  f t l i t   t   
cl e . c  i t r r t ti  r t   t t  
best interests f te tial i ti s  l     
s f t  tit ti . 
